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• We
  use
  a
  normative
  (Bayes
  optimal)
  model
  of
  oculomotor
  pursuit.
• We
  average
  the
  empirical
  responses
  of
  subjects
  performing
  a
  pursuit
  paradigm.
• We
  invert
  these
  responses
  using
  the
  pursuit
  model
  and
  dynamic
  causal
  modelling.
• We
  thereby
  estimate
  the
  precision
  of
  subjects’
  Bayesian
  beliefs
  from
  their
  pursuit.
• This
  could
  be
  used
  to
  quantify
  abnormal
  precision
  encoding
  in
  schizophrenia.
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Background:
  This
  paper
  introduces
  a
  new
  paradigm
  that
  allows
  one
  to
  quantify
  the
  Bayesian
  beliefs
evidenced
 by
 subjects
 during
 oculomotor
 pursuit.
 Subjects’
 eye
 tracking
 responses
 to
 a
 partially
 occluded
sinusoidal
  target
  were
  recorded
  non-invasively
  and
  averaged.
  These
  response
  averages
  were
  then
  ana-
lysed
 using
 dynamic
 causal
 modelling
 (DCM).
 In
 DCM,
 observed
 responses
 are
 modelled
 using
 biologically
plausible
  generative
  or
  forward
  models
  –
  usually
  biophysical
  models
  of
  neuronal
  activity.
New
  method:
  Our
  key
  innovation
  is
  to
  use
  a
  generative
  model
  based
  on
  a
  normative
  (Bayes-optimal)
model
  of
  active
  inference
  to
  model
  oculomotor
  pursuit
  in
  terms
  of
  subjects’
  beliefs
  about
  how
  visual
targets
  move
  and
  how
  their
  oculomotor
  system
  responds.
  Our
  aim
  here
  is
  to
  establish
  the
  face
  validity
of
  the
  approach,
  by
  manipulating
  the
  content
  and
  precision
  of
  sensory
  information
  –
  and
  examining
  the
ensuing
  changes
  in
  the
  subjects’
  implicit
  beliefs.
  These
  beliefs
  are
  inferred
  from
  their
  eye
  movements
using
  the
  normative
  model.
Results:
  We
  show
  that
  on
  average,
  subjects
  respond
  to
  an
  increase
  in
  the
  ‘noise’
  of
  target
  motion
  by
increasing
  sensory
  precision
  in
  their
  models
  of
  the
  target
  trajectory.
  In
  other
  words,
  they
  attend
  more
  to
the
  sensory
  attributes
  of
  a
  noisier
  stimulus.
  Conversely,
  subjects
  only
  change
  kinetic
  parameters
  in
  their
model
  but
  not
  precision,
  in
  response
  to
  increased
  target
  speed.
Conclusions:
 Using
 this
 technique
 one
 can
 estimate
 the
 precisions
 of
 subjects’
 hierarchical
 Bayesian
 beliefs
about
  target
  motion.
  We
  hope
  to
  apply
  this
  paradigm
  to
  subjects
  with
  schizophrenia,
  whose
  pursuit
abnormalities
  may
  result
  from
  the
  abnormal
  encoding
  of
  precision.
©
  2015
  The
  Authors.
  Published
  by
  Elsevier
  B.V.
  This
  is
  an
  open
  access
  article
  under
  the
  CC
  BY
  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1.
  Introduction
This
  paper
  considers
  the
  modelling
  of
  oculomotor
  pursuit
  using
active
  inference
  –
  a
  normative
  or
  Bayes-optimal
  formulation
  of
action
  and
  perception
  which
  has
  been
  used
  to
  address
  a
  range
  of
issues
  in
  the
  cognitive
  neurosciences
  (Friston
  et
  al.,
  2010a).
  In
  a
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previous
  paper,
  we
  formulated
  oculomotor
  control
  during
  smooth
pursuit
  eye
  movements
  (SPEM)
  in
  terms
  of
  active
  inference,
  with
a
  special
  focus
  on
  how
  representations
  of
  uncertainty
  or
  preci-
sion
  could
  affect
  eye
  tracking
  behaviour
  (Adams
  et
  al.,
  2012).
  We
established
  that
  impairment
  in
  the
  encoding
  of
  precision
  (inverse
variance
  of
  random
  ﬂuctuations)
  at
  higher
  levels
  of
  a
  hierarchical
model
  of
  oculomotor
  control
  (e.g.,
  frontal
  eye
  ﬁelds
  or
  prefrontal
cortex)
  resulted
  in
  several
  SPEM
  abnormalities
  characteristic
  of
schizophrenia;
 e.g.,
 a
 greater
 slowing
 of
 pursuit
 during
 target
 occlu-
sion.
  In
  this
  work,
  we
  use
  a
  similar
  generative
  model
  to
  predict
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jneumeth.2015.01.003
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empirical
 eye
 movements,
 and
 thereby
 make
 inferences
 about
 how
subjects
  optimise
  their
  oculomotor
  responses
  to
  moving
  targets.
In
  particular,
  we
  were
  interested
  in
  whether
  we
  could
  induce
changes
 in
 the
 precision
 subjects
 ascribe
 to
 sensory
 information
 (by
changing
  the
  precision
  of
  target
  motion)
  and
  infer
  these
  subjective
changes
  from
  measured
  eye
  movements.
The
  model
  of
  pursuit
  used
  below
  is
  based
  upon
  active
  infer-
ence.
  Active
  inference
  is
  a
  corollary
  of
  the
  free
  energy
  principle
  –
a
  normative
  model
  of
  behaviour
  that
  appeals
  to
  Bayes
  optimality
principles.
 In
 brief,
 the
 principle
 says
 that
 we
 sample
 sensory
 inputs
to
  minimise
  prediction
  errors.
  Clearly,
  prediction
  errors
  depend
upon
  predictions
  and
  inference
  about
  hidden
  states
  of
  the
  world
causing
 sensory
 data.
 A
 crucial
 aspect
 of
 this
 inference
 is
 the
 proper
weighting
  of
  sensory
  evidence
  and
  prior
  beliefs.
  Operationally,
  this
rests
  upon
  weighting
  prediction
  errors
  in
  accord
  with
  their
  pre-
cision
  (reliability
  or
  inverse
  variability).
  This
  is
  formally
  identical
to
  weighted
  least
  squares
  in
  statistics.
  Anecdotally,
  one
  can
  regard
prediction
  errors
  as
  reporting
  what
  is
  newsworthy
  (what
  cannot
be
  predicted)
  and
  precision
  turns
  up
  the
  ‘volume’
  of
  processing
channels
  with
  more
  reliable
  news.
In
  this
  paper,
  we
  present
  the
  methodology
  that
  enables
  one
  to
quantify
  subjective
  precision
  on
  the
  basis
  of
  empirical
  eye
  move-
ments
  –
  as
  a
  prelude
  to
  comparing
  normal
  and
  schizophrenic
cohorts
  (see
  Section
  3).
  If
  changes
  in
  subjective
  precision
  due
  to
alterations
  in
  stimulus
  attributes
  can
  be
  estimated
  from
  pursuit
data,
  then
  perhaps
  abnormalities
  of
  cortical
  precision
  found
  in
  psy-
chiatric
  illness
  can
  be
  disclosed.
This
  paper
  comprises
  the
  following
  sections.
  Section
  2.1
  pro-
vides
  a
  brief
  introduction
  to
  active
  inference
  and
  predictive
coding.
  Active
  inference
  provides
  a
  normative
  model
  of
  oculo-
motor
  behaviour,
  given
  a
  generative
  model
  that
  subjects
  used
  to
predict
  their
  behaviour,
  described
  in
  Section
  2.2.
  Section
  2.3
  pro-
vides
  a
  brief
  overview
  of
  dynamic
  causal
  modelling
  –
  a
  standard
variational
  Bayesian
  scheme
  for
  inverting
  dynamic
  or
  state
  space
models.
  Section
  2.4
  describes
  the
  experimental
  paradigm
  used
to
  elicit
  oculomotor
  pursuit
  under
  visual
  occlusion
  and
  Section
3
  presents
  the
  dynamic
  causal
  modelling
  results
  using
  the
  active
inference
  model.
  Section
  4
  concludes
  with
  some
  comments
  about
the
  potential
  applications
  of
  this
  non-invasive
  approach
  to
  quan-
tifying
  subjective
  beliefs
  or
  expectations
  entertained
  by
  subjects
  –
and
  how
  the
  scheme
  can
  be
  extended
  to
  cover
  neurophysiological
responses.
2.
  Materials
  and
  methods
2.1.
  Active
  inference,
  generalised
  ﬁltering
  and
  free
  energy
This
  section
  introduces
  active
  inference
  in
  terms
  of
  generalised
Bayesian
  ﬁltering
  –
  also
  known
  as
  predictive
  coding.
  In
  brief,
  active
inference
  can
  be
  regarded
  as
  equipping
  standard
  Bayesian
  update
schemes
  with
  classical
  reﬂex
  arcs
  that
  enable
  action
  to
  fulﬁl
  pre-
dictions
  about
  (hidden)
  states
  of
  the
  world.
  We
  will
  describe
  the
formalism
  of
  active
  inference
  in
  terms
  of
  differential
  equations
describing
  the
  dynamics
  of
  the
  world
  –
  and
  internal
  states
  of
the
  visual–oculomotor
  system.
  This
  scheme
  is
  used
  in
  subsequent
sections
  to
  predict
  pursuit
  movements
  under
  different
  levels
  of
conﬁdence
  (precision)
  about
  hierarchical
  predictions.
Active
  inference
  is
  based
  on
  three
  assumptions
  that
  formalise
the
  notion
  that
  the
  brain
  generates
  predictions
  of
  its
  sensory
  sam-
ples
  to
  conﬁrm
  hypotheses
  about
  the
  state
  of
  the
  world
  –
  and
  how
the
  world
  is
  sampled:
• The
  brain
  minimises
  the
  free
  energy
  of
  sensory
  inputs
  deﬁned
  by
a
  generative
  model.
Fig.
 1.
  Exchange
 with
 the
 environment.
 This
 schematic
 illustrates
 the
 dependencies
among
  various
  quantities
  modelling
  exchanges
  of
  an
  agent
  with
  the
  environment.
It
  shows
  the
  states
  of
  the
  environment
  and
  the
  system
  in
  terms
  of
  a
  probabilistic
dependency
  graph,
  where
  connections
  denote
  directed
  dependencies.
  The
  quanti-
ties
  are
  described
  within
  the
  nodes
  of
  this
  graph
  –
  with
  exemplar
  forms
  for
  their
dependencies
  on
  other
  variables
  (see
  main
  text).
  Hidden
  and
  internal
  states
  of
  the
agent
  are
  separated
  by
  action
  and
  sensory
  states.
  Both
  action
  and
  internal
  states
  –
encoding
  posterior
  or
  conditional
  expectations
  about
  hidden
  states
  –
  minimise
  free
energy.
  Note
  that
  hidden
  states
  in
  the
  real
  world
  and
  the
  form
  of
  their
  dynamics
  can
be
  different
  from
  that
  assumed
  by
  the
  generative
  model;
  this
  is
  why
  hidden
  states
are
  in
  bold
  and
  internal
  states
  are
  in
  italics.
  See
  main
  text
  for
  further
  details.
• The
  generative
  model
  used
  by
  the
  brain
  is
  hierarchical,
  nonlinear
and
  dynamic.
• Neuronal
  ﬁring
  rates
  encode
  the
  expected
  state
  of
  the
  world,
under
  this
  model.
The
  ﬁrst
  assumption
  is
  the
  free
  energy
  principle,
  which
  leads
  to
active
  inference
  in
  the
  embodied
  context
  of
  action.
  The
  free
  energy
here
  is
  a
  proxy
  for
  Bayesian
  model
  evidence.
  In
  Bayesian
  terms,
minimising
  free
  energy
  means
  that
  the
  brain
  maximises
  the
  evi-
dence
  for
  its
  model
  of
  sensory
  inputs
  (Gregory,
  1980;
  Ballard
  et
  al.,
1983;
  Dayan
  et
  al.,
  1995;
  Olshausen
  and
  Field,
  1996;
  Grossberg
et
  al.,
  1997;
  Bialek
  et
  al.,
  2001;
  Knill
  and
  Pouget,
  2004),
  in
  accord
with
  the
  Bayesian
  brain
  hypothesis
  (Yuille
  and
  Kersten,
  2006;
Maloney
  and
  Zhang,
  2010).
  If
  we
  also
  allow
  action
  to
  maximise
model
 evidence
 we
 get
 active
 inference
 (Friston
 et
 al.,
 2010a).
 In
 this
setting,
  desired
  movements
  are
  speciﬁed
  in
  terms
  of
  prior
  beliefs
about
  hidden
  states
  in
  the
  generative
  model.
  Action
  then
  realises
prior
  beliefs
  by
  sampling
  sensory
  inputs
  to
  provide
  evidence
  for
those
  expectations.
  The
  second
  assumption
  above
  is
  motivated
  by
noting
  that
  the
  world
  is
  both
  dynamic
  and
  nonlinear
  and
  that
  hier-
archical
 structure
 emerges
 inevitably
 from
 a
 separation
 of
 temporal
scales
  (Ginzburg,
  1955;
  Haken,
  1983).
  The
  ﬁnal
  assumption
  is
  the
Laplace
  assumption
  that,
  in
  terms
  of
  neural
  codes,
  leads
  to
  the
Laplace
  code,
  which
  is
  arguably
  the
  simplest
  and
  most
  ﬂexible
  of
all
  candidate
  codes
  (Friston,
  2009).
Under
  these
  assumptions,
  action
  and
  perception
  can
  be
regarded
  as
  the
  solutions
  to
  coupled
  differential
  equations
  describ-
ing
  the
  dynamics
  of
  the
  real
  world,
  action
  and
  perception
  (Friston
et
  al.,
  2010a):
s
  =
  g(x,
 v,
 a)
  +
  ωs
˙ x =
  f(x,
 v,
 a)
  +
  ωx
(1)
˙ a =
  −∂aF(˜ s,
  ˜  )
˙ ˜   =
  D
  ˜  
  −
  ∂ ˜  F(˜ s,
  ˜  )
(2)
See
  Fig.
  1
  for
  a
  schematic
  summary
  of
  the
  conditional
  dependen-
cies
  implied
  by
  Eqs.
  (1)
  and
  (2).
  For
  clarity,
  real-world
  states
  are
written
  in
  boldface,
  while
  the
  states
  of
  the
  agent
  are
  in
  italics.
  The
∼
  notation
  denotes
  variables
  in
  generalised
  coordinates
  of
  motion
where ˜ s
  =
  (s,
 s ,
 s  ,
 .
 .
 .)
  (Friston
  et
  al.,
  2010b).
  The
  pairs
  of
  equa-
tions
  are
  coupled
  because
  sensory
  states
  s(t)
  depend
  upon
  action
a(t)
  through
  non-linear
  functions
  (g,
  f)
  of
  hidden
  states
  and
  causesR.A.
  Adams
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(x,
  v),
  while
  action
  depends
  upon
  sensory
  states
  through
  inter-
nal
  states
  ˜  (t).
  Internal
  states
  play
  the
  role
  of
  expectations
  about
hidden
  states
  that
  minimise
  free
  energy
  –
F
  =
  Eq[ln
 q(˜ x,
  ˜ v|
  ˜  )
  −
  ln
 p(˜ s, ˜ x,
  ˜ v|m)]
  (3)
–
  or
  maximise
  (a
  lower
  bound
  on)
  Bayesian
  model
  evidence
ln
 p(˜ s|m)≥
  −
  F.
  Here,
  q(˜ x,
  ˜ v|
  ˜  )
  is
  an
  approximate
  posterior
  density
over
  hidden
  variables
  (˜ x,
  ˜ v)
  that
  is
  parameterised
  by
  their
  expected
values.
 Note
 that
 the
 free
 energy
 depends
 upon
 a
 generative
 model:
p(˜ s, ˜ x,
  ˜ v|m)
  =
  p(˜ s|˜ x,
  ˜ v)p(˜ x,
  ˜ v|m)
  (4)
This
  model,
  denoted
  by
  m,
  is
  usually
  speciﬁed
  in
  terms
  of
  a
  like-
lihood
  and
  prior
  (see
  below).
  Hidden
  causes
  can
  be
  thought
  of
  as
inputs
  or
  perturbations
  to
  hidden
  states
  that
  produce
  sensations.
In
  this
  paper,
  the
  hidden
  cause
  is
  a
  force
  on
  a
  target
  and
  the
  hid-
den
  states
  are
  the
  ensuing
  motion
  of
  the
  target
  (and
  eye).
  Eq.
  (1)
describes
  the
  dynamics
  of
  hidden
  states
  and
  causes
  in
  the
  world
and
  how
  these
  generate
  sensory
  data.
  These
  equations
  are
  stochas-
tic
  because
  sensory
  states
  and
  the
  motion
  of
  hidden
  states
  are
subject
  to
  random
  ﬂuctuations
  ωs,
 ωx.
  The
  second
  pair
  of
  differen-
tial
  equations
  (Eq.
  (2))
  corresponds
  to
  action
  and
  perception
  –
  they
constitute
  a
  gradient
  descent
  on
  variational
  free
  energy.
  The
  differ-
ential
  operator
  D
  returns
  the
  generalised
  motion
  of
  the
  conditional
expectations
  –
  such
  that
  D
  ˜  
  =
  (  ,
    ,
     ,
 .
 .
 .).
To
 perform
 simulations
 using
 this
 scheme,
 one
 simply
 integrates
or
  solves
  Eqs.
  (1)
  and
  (2)
  to
  simulate
  (neuronal)
  dynamics
  that
encode
  expectations
  and
  ensuing
  action.
  The
  vector
  D
  ˜  
  is
  han-
dled
  numerically
  by
  truncating
  the
  order
  of
  generalised
  motion
  to
a
  small
  number
  (usually
  between
  two
  and
  six).
  One
  can
  do
  this
because
  the
  precision
  of
  high
  order
  motion
  disappears
  quickly,
even
  for
  relatively
  smooth
  ﬂuctuations.
  The
  variational
  free
  energy
depends
  upon
  a
  generative
  model,
  which
  we
  assume
  has
  the
  hier-
archical
  form
  shown
  in
  Eq.
  (5),
  in
  which
  the
  hierarchical
  level
  is
denoted
  by
  (i):
s
  =
  g(1)(x(1),
 v(1))
  +
  ω
(1)
v
˙ x(1) =
  f (1)(x(1),
 v(1))
  +
  ω
(1)
x
. . .
v(i−1) =
  g(i)(x(i),
 v(i))
  +
  ω
(i)
v
˙ x(i) =
  f (i)(x(i),
 v(i))
  +
  ω
(i)
x
. . .
(5)
This
  equation
  denotes
  a
  generative
  model
  m
  that
  speciﬁes
  a
  prob-
ability
  density
  function
  over
  sensory
  inputs
  and
  hidden
  states
  and
causes
 (Eq.
 (4)).
 This
 probability
 density
 is
 needed
 to
 deﬁne
 the
 free
energy
  (Eq.
  (3))
  and
  rests
  on
  Gaussian
  assumptions
  about
  random
ﬂuctuations
  (ω
(i)
x ,
 ω
(i)
v )
  on
  the
  motion
  of
  hidden
  states
  and
  causes.
These
  ﬂuctuations
  play
  the
  role
  of
  sensory
  noise
  at
  the
  ﬁrst
  level
and
  induce
  uncertainty
  about
  states
  at
  higher
  levels.
  The
  (inverse)
amplitudes
  of
  these
  ﬂuctuations
  are
  quantiﬁed
  by
  their
  precisions
(˘
(i)
x ,
 ˘
(i)
v ).
The
  deterministic
  part
  of
  the
  model
  is
  speciﬁed
  by
  nonlin-
ear
  functions
  (g(i),
 f (i))
  of
  hidden
  states
  and
  causes
  that
  generate
dynamics
 and
 sensory
 consequences.
 Hidden
 causes
 link
 hierarchi-
cal
  levels,
  whereas
  hidden
  states
  link
  dynamics
  over
  time.
  Hidden
states
  and
  causes
  are
  abstract
  quantities
  that
  the
  brain
  uses
  to
explain
  or
  predict
  sensations
  –
  like
  the
  motion
  of
  an
  object
  in
  the
ﬁeld
  of
  view.
  In
  hierarchical
  models
  of
  this
  sort,
  the
  output
  of
  one
level
  acts
  as
  an
  input
  to
  the
  next;
  at
  the
  bottom
  of
  the
  model
  is
  not
v(0) but
  s,
  the
  sensations
  it
  is
  trying
  to
  predict.
  This
  input
  can
  pro-
duce
  complicated
  convolutions
  with
  deep
  (hierarchical)
  structure,
as
  we
  will
  see
  examples
  of
  this
  later.
In
  terms
  of
  the
  biological
  implementation
  of
  active
  inference,
expectations
  can
  be
  updated
  using
  predictive
  coding
  (Rao
  and
Ballard,
  1999;
  Friston,
  2005),
  which
  minimises
  free
  energy
  in
  the
form
  of
  prediction
  errors.
  In
  other
  implementations
  of
  the
  active
inference
  framework,
  action
  is
  produced
  by
  proprioceptive
  predic-
tions
  that
  descend
  to
  the
  level
  of
  (pontine)
  cranial
  nerve
  nuclei
and
  the
  spinal-cord.
  These
  engage
  classical
  reﬂex
  arcs
  to
  suppress
proprioceptive
  prediction
  errors
  and
  elicit
  the
  predicted
  motor
  tra-
jectory.
 The
 reduction
 of
 action
 to
 classical
 reﬂexes
 follows
 because
the
  only
  way
  that
  action
  can
  minimise
  free
  energy
  is
  to
  change
  sen-
sory
 (proprioceptive)
 prediction
 error.
 In
 short,
 active
 inference
 can
be
  regarded
  as
  equipping
  a
  generalised
  predictive
  coding
  scheme
with
  classical
  reﬂex
  arcs:
  see
  Adams
  et
  al.
  (2013a),
  Friston
  et
  al.
(2010a)
  for
  details.
Active
  inference
  in
  the
  oculomotor
  system
  may
  eschew
  an
explicit
  computation
  of
  proprioceptive
  prediction
  errors
  in
  cra-
nial
  nerve
  nuclei
  –
  because
  the
  oculomotor
  system
  does
  not
  have
to
  contend
  with
  context-sensitive
  loads
  on
  the
  eye
  (and
  has
  to
produce
 rapid
 movements).
 Indeed,
 proprioceptive
 deafferentation
does
 not
 affect
 oculomotor
 function
 in
 monkeys
 (Lewis
 et
 al.,
 2001).
This
  suggests
  proprioceptive
  predictions
  must
  be
  transformed
  into
motor
  commands
  by
  a
  simple
  inverse
  model,
  rather
  than
  being
realised
  by
  a
  classical
  reﬂex.
  This
  inverse
  model
  is
  simple
  because
proprioceptive
  predictions
  and
  motor
  commands
  are
  in
  the
  same
(motor)
  frame
  of
  reference.
  Interestingly,
  the
  inclusion
  of
  ocu-
lomotor
  delays
  in
  the
  current
  model
  mandates
  a
  simple
  inverse
modelling
  of
  delayed
  kinematics
  (Perrinet
  et
  al.,
  2014).
  Having
  said
this,
  the
  (peripheral)
  mechanism
  by
  which
  descending
  propriocep-
tive
  predictions
  produce
  oculomotor
  commands
  is
  not
  important
for
  our
  purposes:
  we
  are
  interested
  in
  the
  effects
  –
  and
  estimation
–
  of
  precision
  in
  the
  (central)
  model.
In
  summary,
  we
  have
  derived
  the
  dynamics
  of
  perception
  and
action
  using
  a
  free
  energy
  formulation
  of
  Bayes-optimal
  exchanges
with
  the
  world
  and
  a
  generative
  model
  that
  can
  be
  implemented
  a
biologically
 plausible
 fashion.
 A
 technical
 treatment
 of
 the
 material
above
  is
  found
  in
  Friston
  et
  al.
  (2010),
  which
  provides
  the
  details
of
  the
  generalised
  ﬁltering
  used
  in
  subsequent
  sections.
  To
  use
  this
scheme
  in
  any
  particular
  setting,
  one
  has
  to
  specify
  the
  particular
generative
 model
 in
 Eq.
 (5).
 We
 now
 turn
 to
 the
 oculomotor
 pursuit
model
  used
  in
  this
  work.
2.2.
  Oculomotor
  pursuit
  model
The
  oculomotor
  pursuit
  model
  used
  here
  is
  based
  on
  the
  gener-
ative
  model
  of
  SPEM
  described
  in
  Adams
  et
  al.
  (2012)
  but
  with
  one
fundamental
  change.
  Our
  previous
  model
  was
  of
  smooth
  pursuit
only
  –
  while
  it
  could
  generate
  catch-up
  movements
  of
  saccade-like
speed,
  it
  could
  not
  generate
  anticipatory
  movements.
  In
  this
  appli-
cation,
  we
  wanted
  to
  model
  grand
  averaged
  empirical
  eye
  traces,
and
 so
 we
 had
 to
 choose
 between
 removing
 saccades
 to
 create
 aver-
age
  eye
  velocity
  traces
  and
  averaging
  eye
  displacements
  in
  toto.
The
  second
  option
  was
  preferred,
  because
  removing
  the
  saccadic
portion
  of
  the
  trace
  would
  dismiss
  the
  synergy
  between
  saccades
and
  SPEM
  during
  target
  occlusion
  (Orban
  de
  Xivry
  et
  al.,
  2006),
and
  suppress
  the
  anticipatory
  nature
  of
  the
  eye
  movements
  we
observed.
This
  oculomotor
  pursuit
  model
  is
  essentially
  a
  model
  designed
to
  generate
  ‘grand
  averaged’
  pursuit
  movements
  (which
  include
both
 SPEM
 and
 saccades):
 it
 does
 not
 reproduce
 the
 enormous
 vari-
ability
  of
  single
  trial
  data.
  It
  is
  neither
  a
  model
  of
  smooth
  pursuit
per
  se,
  nor
  of
  separate
  (pursuit
  and
  saccadic)
  systems:
  it
  is
  not
designed
  to
  explain
  how
  pursuit
  and
  saccades
  might
  operate
  in
isolation,
  unlike
  many
  models
  of
  oculomotor
  control.
  The
  purpose
of
  this
  model
  is
  to
  derive
  estimates
  of
  subjective
  precision
  at
  differ-
ent
  levels
  in
  a
  hierarchical
  model
  of
  pursuit:
  these
  precisions
  are
  key
parameters,
 which
 –
 if
 the
 brain
 performs
 Bayesian
 inference–must4
  R.A.
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exist
  ‘in
  the
  head’.
  In
  future
  work,
  we
  will
  correlate
  estimates
  of
subjective
  precision
  (from
  grand
  averaged
  pursuit
  data)
  with
  neu-
ronal
  estimates
  of
  synaptic
  gain
  (from
  grand
  averaged
  MEG
  data)
that
  are
  thought
  to
  encode
  precision.
  If
  successful,
  this
  will
  serve
  as
a
  validation
  of
  inverting
  models
  of
  average
  pursuit
  trajectories
  to
provide
  a
  non-invasive
  assay
  of
  synaptic
  gain
  (i.e.,
  subjective
  pre-
cision)
  in
  different
  subject
  cohorts.
  The
  remaining
  parameters
  (and
model
 structure)
 are
 not
 intended
 to
 be
 biologically
 realistic,
 except
in
  the
  general
  sense
  of
  realising
  a
  hierarchical
  Bayesian
  model
  of
  a
smoothly
  moving
  target.
Eye
  movements
  are
  modelled
  as
  if
  they
  were
  driven
  reﬂexively
by
  descending
  predictions
  based
  upon
  the
  following
  beliefs:
  the
subject
  believes
  there
  is
  an
  invisible
  location
  –
  moving
  sinusoidally
along
 a
 horizontal
 line–that
 is
 attracting
 a
 target.
 Crucially,
 the
 sub-
ject
  also
  believes
  that
  the
  centre
  of
  gaze
  is
  attracted
  to
  this
  invisible
location,
  the
  target
  or
  both.
  This
  means
  that
  the
  eye
  movements
do
  not
  always
  try
  to
  track
  the
  target
  itself,
  but
  sometimes
  a
  point
which
  is
  always
  just
  ahead
  of
  the
  target.
  The
  latter
  is
  useful
  when
  a
target
  is
  moving
  quickly;
  for
  example,
  as
  when
  ice
  hockey
  coaches
advise
  young
  players
  not
  to
  try
  to
  hit
  the
  puck
  itself,
  but
  ‘where
  the
puck
  is
  going’.
  Furthermore,
  attraction
  to
  the
  invisible
  location
  and
target
  may
  or
  may
  not
  depend
  upon
  whether
  they
  lie
  behind
  an
occluder.
  This
  enables
  the
  model
  to
  make
  anticipatory
  eye
  move-
ments;
  for
  example,
  if
  the
  target
  is
  occluded
  the
  eye
  can
  track
  the
invisible
  attracting
  location
  instead.
  The
  relative
  attraction
  of
  the
invisible
  location
  and
  target
  –
  and
  the
  inﬂuence
  of
  the
  occlude
  –
depends
  upon
  the
  (kinetic)
  parameters
  of
  each
  subject’s
  genera-
tive
  model
  (see
  below).
  This
  model
  allows
  for
  many
  contingencies
and
  entails
  a
  relatively
  large
  number
  of
  parameters.
  However,
  we
will
  see
  later
  that
  redundant
  parameters
  (or
  model
  components)
can
  be
  eliminated
  using
  Bayesian
  model
  optimisation.
We
  now
  consider
  the
  model
  in
  more
  detail
  (also
  see
  Fig.
  2).
  The
‘real
  world’
  generating
  sensory
  inputs
  is
  shown
  on
  the
  left
  of
  Fig.
  2.
We
  go
  through
  the
  equations
  in
  turn:
s
  =
 
so
st
 
=
 
xo
g(v,
 xo)
 
+
  s (6)
Eq.
  (6)
  says
  that
  the
  world
  provides
  sensory
  input
  in
  two
  modali-
ties.
  First,
  the
  output
  of
  an
  oculomotor
  inverse
  model
  reports
  the
(horizontal)
  angular
  displacement
  of
  the
  eye
  s0 and
  corresponds
  to
the
  centre
  of
  gaze
  in
  extrinsic
  coordinates
  x0.
  Second,
  visual
  input
reports
  the
  angular
  position
  of
  a
  target
  in
  a
  retinal
  (intrinsic)
  frame
of
  reference
  st.
  This
  input
  models
  the
  response
  of
  visual
  channels,
each
  equipped
  with
  a
  Gaussian
  receptive
  ﬁeld
  with
  a
  width
  of
  one
angular
 unit
 and
 deployed
 at
 intervals
 of
 one
 angular
 unit
 (about
 2◦
of
  visual
  angle).
  These
  receptive
  ﬁelds
  are
  centred
  on
  the
  locations
in
  the
  vector   r =
  [−8,
 .
 .
 .,
 0,
 .
 .
 .,
 8],
  where
  0
  is
  the
  centre
  of
  gaze.
Crucially,
  this
  visual
  input
  can
  be
  occluded
  by
  a
  function
  of
  target
location
  O(v)
 ∈
 [0,
 1]:
g(v,
 xo)
  =
  O(v)
  ·
  exp(−(  r
  +
  xo −
  v)
2)
  (7)
v
  =
  cos(2 t)
  (8)
This
  means
  that
  whenever
  the
  sinusoidally-varying
  target
  location
(hidden
  cause)
  v
  is
  behind
  the
  occluder,
  visual
  input
  falls
  to
  zero.
The
  response
  of
  each
  visual
  channel
  depends
  upon
  the
  distance
of
  the
  target
  from
  the
  centre
  of
  gaze.
  This
  is
  just
  the
  difference
between
  the
  oculomotor
  angle
  and
  target
  location
  in
  an
  extrinsic
frame
  of
  reference:
  xo–v.
˙ x =
 
˙ xo
˙ x
 
o
 
=
 
x 
o
a
  −
  x 
o
 
+
  x (9)
Eq.
  (9)
  describes
  the
  hidden
  states
  of
  this
  model
  which
  comprise
oculomotor
  angle
  and
  velocity
  (xo,
 x 
o),
  where
  velocity
  is
  driven
  by
action
  and
  decays
  to
  zero,
  with
  a
  time
  constant
  of
  one
  time
  step
(about
  16
 ms).
  This
  means
  the
  action
  applies
  forces
  to
  the
  oculo-
motor
  plant,
  which
  responds
  with
  a
  degree
  of
  viscosity.
The
 generative
 model
 is
 shown
 on
 the
 right
 of
 Fig.
 2
 and
 detailed
below.
  It
  has
  a
  similar
  form
  –
  at
  the
  sensory
  level
  the
  models
  are
identical
 (compare
 Eqs.
 (10)
 and
 (6),
 and
 (11)
 and
 (7)),
 although
 the
subject’s
  estimation
  of
  target
  position
  xt has
  replaced
  its
  real
  world
value
  v:
s
  =
 
so
st
 
=
 
xo
g(xt,
 xo)
 
+
  ωs (10)
g(xt,
 xo)
  =
  O(xt)
  ·
  exp(−(  r +
  xo −
  xt)
2)
  (11)
Note
  that
  the
  sensory
  input
  is
  exactly
  the
  same
  as
  the
  sensations
generated
  by
  the
  real-world
  process
  (Eq.
  (6)).
  However,
  there
  are
two
  important
  differences
  between
  the
  generative
  process
  and
  the
generative
  model
  of
  the
  process:
  there
  is
  no
  action
  and
  both
  the
target
  and
  centre
  of
  gaze
  are
  drawn
  to
  a
  (ﬁctive)
  attracting
  location
whose
  position
  is
  encoded
  by
  a
  hidden
  cause
  v:
v
  =
  exp( 7)
  ·
  cos(2 t
  +
  exp( 8))
  +
  ωv (12)
Eq.
  (12)
  shows
  the
  attracting
  location
  v
  is
  a
  sinusoidal
  function
  of
time
  with
  parameters
  controlling
  its
  amplitude
  and
  phase
  ( 7,
  8).
Further
  parameters
  control
  the
  evolution
  of
  hidden
  states
  (note
that
  the
  expected
  motion
  x 
o is
  distinct
  from
  the
  motion
  of
  the
expectation ˙ xo:
  heuristically,
  this
  is
  like
  the
  difference
  between
motion-sensitive
 responses
 in
 V5
 and
 the
 motion
 of
 peak
 responses
in
  V1):
˙ x =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
˙ xo
˙ x 
o
˙ xt
˙ x 
t
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
=
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
x 
o
 v(v
  −
  xo)
  +
   t(xt −
  xo)
  −
   2x 
o
x 
t
1
4(v
  −
  xt)
  −
   6x 
t
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
+
  ωx (13)
The
  hidden
  location
  v
  attracts
  the
  target
  –
  i.e.
  changes
  in
  tar-
get
  velocity ˙ x 
t are
  driven
  by
  the
  distance
  between
  the
  target
  and
invisible
  location
  (v
  −
  xt)
  –
  but
  with
  a
  viscosity
  encoded
  by
   6.
The
  viscosity
  of
  eye
  movements
  is
  encoded
  by
   2.
  Changes
  in
eye
  velocity ˙ x 
o are
  determined
  by
  a
  weighted
  combination
  of
  the
distances
  between
  the
  eye
  and
  the
  invisible
  location
  and
  target
 v(v
  −
  xo)
  +
   t(xt −
  xo).
  The
  relative
  strength
  of
  these
  two
  forces
depends
  on
  whether
  the
  target
  or
  invisible
  locations
  are
  occluded:
 v =
   1 −
   4O(v
  ∨
  xt)
  (14)
 t =
   3 +
   5O(v
  ∨
  xt)
  (15)
Each
  strength
  ( v,
  t)
  has
  a
  ﬁxed
  component
  and
  an
  occluder-
dependent
  component
  (Eqs.
  (14)
  and
  (15))
  that
  depends
  on
  the
remaining
  kinetic
  parameters
  ( 1,
  3,
  4,
  5).
  Here,
  the
  occluder
  is
a
  function
  of
  the
  disjunction
  (inclusive
  ‘or’)
  of
  attractor
  and
  target
location
  –
  such
  that
  changes
  in
   
  anticipate
  the
  emergence
  of
  xt
from
  the
  occluder).
The
  resulting
  set
  up
  is
  shown
  on
  the
  upper
  right
  of
  Fig.
  2:
  the
generative
  model
  believes
  that
  the
  centre
  of
  gaze
  (blue
  circle)
  is
attracted
 to
 the
 hidden
 location
 or
 cause
 (pink
 circle)
 and
 the
 target
(red
  circle).
  The
  hidden
  location
  drives
  eye
  movement
  when
  the
target
  is
  either
  visible
  or
  occluded.
  The
  priors
  for
  the
  parameters
are
  chosen
  such
  that
  when
  the
  occluder
  is
  present,
  the
  strength
of
  attraction
  to
  the
  hidden
  location
  increases
  and
  the
  strength
  of
attraction
  to
  the
  target
  decreases,
  as
  one
  might
  expect.
  Finally,
  the
model
  parameters
  include
  the
  precision
  of
  random
  ﬂuctuations
  at
each
  level
  (Eqs.
  (10),
  (12)
  and
  (13));
  namely,
  the
  sensory
  input
  (ωs),
the
  motion
  of
  the
  hidden
  states
  (ωx)
  and
  the
  hidden
  cause
  (ωv).
  The
ω
  terms
  are
  independent
  random
  effects.R.A.
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Fig.
  2.
  Generative
  process
  and
  model
  of
  oculomotor
  pursuit
  movements.
  This
  schematic
  illustrates
  the
  process
  (left
  panel)
  and
  generative
  model
  of
  that
  process
  (right
  panel)
used
  to
  simulate
  Bayes
  optimal
  pursuit.
  The
  graphics
  on
  the
  left
  show
  a
  putative
  predictive
  coding
  scheme
  (with
  superﬁcial
  pyramidal
  cells
  in
  red
  and
  deep
  pyramidal
  cells
in
  black
  in
  the
  pontine
  nuclei)
  processing
  proprioceptive
  information
  during
  oculomotor
  pursuit.
  These
  cells
  receive
  proprioceptive
  information
  from
  an
  inverse
  model
  in
the
  subcortical
  oculomotor
  system
  and
  respond
  reﬂexively
  to
  minimise
  proprioceptive
  prediction
  error
  through
  action.
  This
  prediction
  error
  rests
  on
  descending
  predictions
from
  the
  generative
  model
  on
  the
  right.
  The
  actual
  movement
  of
  the
  target
  is
  determined
  by
  a
  hidden
  cause
  (target
  location),
  which
  determines
  the
  visual
  input
  for
  any
  given
direction
  of
  gaze.
  The
  generative
  model
  entails
  beliefs
  about
  how
  the
  target
  and
  eyes
  move.
  In
  brief,
  this
  model
  includes
  an
  invisible
  location
  that
  attracts
  the
  target,
  causing
it
  to
  move.
  Crucially,
  the
  agent
  believes
  that
  its
  centre
  of
  gaze
  is
  attracted
  to
  this
  location
  (and
  the
  target),
  where
  the
  forces
  of
  attraction
  may
  (or
  may
  not)
  depend
  upon
occlusion
  of
  the
  target
  and
  its
  attracting
  location.
  These
  forces
  of
  attraction
  are
  illustrated
  with
  lilac
  arrows
  in
  the
  top
  right;
  the
  arrows
  are
  labelled
  with
  their
  respective
multipliers
  from
  the
  equations
  directly
  below.
  Please
  see
  main
  text
  for
  a
  description
  of
  the
  variables
  in
  the
  equations
  describing
  the
  motion
  of
  hidden
  states
  and
  how
  they
depend
  upon
  hidden
  causes.
  Note
  that
  real
  states
  that
  are
  hidden
  from
  observation
  in
  the
  real
  world
  are
  in
  bold,
  whereas
  the
  hidden
  states
  assumed
  by
  the
  generative
  model
are
  in
  italics.
  (For
  interpretation
  of
  the
  references
  to
  color
  in
  the
  text,
  the
  reader
  is
  referred
  to
  the
  web
  version
  of
  this
  article.)
Having
  speciﬁed
  the
  generative
  process
  and
  model,
  we
  can
  now
solve
  the
  active
  inference
  scheme
  in
  Eqs.
  (1)
  and
  (2)
  and
  use
  this
to
  predict
  observed
  behaviour.
  Fig.
  3
  shows
  the
  posterior
  or
  con-
ditional
  expectations
  about
  hidden
  states
  and
  causes
  during
  the
simulation
  of
  pursuit
  over
  one
  cycle
  of
  target
  motion.
  This
  simula-
tion
 assumes
 some
 particular
 values
 for
 the
 parameters
 that
 we
 will
use
 as
 prior
 expectations
 later
 (see
 Table
 1).
 In
 both
 the
 simulations
and
  later
  empirical
  studies
  the
  target
  was
  occluded
  whenever
  it
passed
  behind
  an
  occluder
  at
  a
  leftward
  displacement
  of
  0–0.8
  of
maximal
  target
  displacement.
  In
  this
  simulation,
  the
  expected
  log
precision
  of
  the
  random
  ﬂuctuations
  of
  sensory
  input,
  motion
  of
hidden
  states
  and
  the
  hidden
  cause
  in
  the
  generative
  model
  were
all
  set
  to
  four.
  This
  corresponds
  to
  an
  expected
  standard
  devia-
tion
  of
  exp(−2)
  =
  0.135
  (of
  maximum
  target
  displacement).
  We
Table
  1
Prior
  expectations
  of
  model
  parameters
  and
  log
  precisions.
Parameter
  class
  Model
  parameter
  Short
  description
  Prior
  expectation
Kinetic ( 1,
  4)
  Parameters
  encoding
  how
  gaze
  is
  attracted
  to
  the
  invisible
  location
  –
  occluder
  independent
  and
  dependent.
  ( 1
4, 1
32)
( 3,
  5)
  Parameters
  encoding
  how
  gaze
  is
  attracted
  to
  the
  target
  location
  –
  occluder
  independent
  and
  dependent
  ( 1
2, 1
32)
( 2,
  6)
  Parameters
  encoding
  the
  viscosity
  of
  eye
  and
  target
  motion
  (ﬁxed
  between
  experimental
  conditions)
  ( 1
2, 1
4)
Precision ln
 ˘s Log
  precision
  of
  sensory
  noise
  4
ln
 ˘x Log
  precision
  of
  eye
  and
  target
  motion
  4
ln
 ˘v Log
  precision
  encoding
  the
  motion
  of
  the
  attracting
  location
  4
Prior
  ( 7,
  8)
  Parameters
  encoding
  the
  amplitude
  and
  phase
  lag
  behind
  the
  invisible
  attracting
  location
  (1, 2 
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Fig.
  3.
  Simulation
  of
  pursuit
  of
  a
  partially
  occluded
  target.
  This
  ﬁgure
  reports
  the
  posterior
  or
  conditional
  expectations
  about
  hidden
  states
  and
  causes
  during
  the
  simulation
of
  oculomotor
  pursuit
  movements
  over
  one
  cycle
  of
  target
  motion.
  The
  position
  of
  the
  occluder
  is
  illustrated
  in
  all
  panels
  by
  the
  parallel
  grey
  lines
  –
  these
  do
  not
  always
coincide
  with
  changes
  in
  state
  estimates
  because
  the
  latter
  are
  calculated
  in
  16
 ms
  time
  steps.
  The
  upper
  left
  panel
  shows
  the
  proprioceptive
  predictions
  (blue
  line)
  and
prediction
  errors
  (dotted
  red
  lines).
  The
  upper
  middle
  panel
  shows
  the
  predicted
  retinal
  input
  –
  the
  red,
  cyan
  and
  purple
  lines
  correspond
  to
  the
  middle
  three
  of
  an
  array
of
  17
  photoreceptors
  (the
  target
  is
  centrally
  ﬁxated)
  –
  and
  the
  dotted
  red
  lines
  are
  prediction
  errors.
  The
  sensory
  predictions
  are
  based
  upon
  the
  expectations
  of
  hidden
oculomotor
  (blue
  line)
  and
  target
  (red
  line)
  angular
  displacements
  shown
  on
  the
  lower
  left;
  the
  corresponding
  velocities
  are
  shown
  as
  the
  green
  (eye)
  and
  cyan
  (target)
  lines
on
  the
  lower
  middle
  graph.
  The
  grey
  regions
  correspond
  to
  90%
  Bayesian
  conﬁdence
  intervals.
  Note
  the
  increase
  in
  uncertainty
  about
  the
  location
  of
  the
  target
  during
  periods
of
  occlusion.
  The
  hidden
  cause
  of
  these
  displacements
  (broken
  black
  line)
  is
  shown
  with
  its
  conditional
  expectation
  (blue
  line)
  in
  the
  lower
  right
  panel.
  The
  true
  cause
  and
action
  are
  shown
  on
  the
  upper
  right.
  The
  action
  (blue
  line)
  is
  responsible
  for
  oculomotor
  displacements
  and
  is
  driven
  by
  proprioceptive
  prediction
  errors.
suppressed
  the
  random
  ﬂuctuations
  in
  the
  generative
  process
  so
that
  the
  target
  motion
  was
  inﬁnitely
  precise.
  (In
  our
  subsequent
experiment,
  random
  ﬂuctuations
  in
  the
  generative
  process
  were
either
  suppressed
  or
  accentuated,
  and
  the
  estimated
  or
  subjective
precision
  was
  inferred
  from
  their
  eye
  movements.)
The
  upper
  left
  and
  middle
  panels
  of
  Fig.
  3
  show
  the
  predicted
sensory
  input
  (coloured
  lines)
  and
  sensory
  prediction
  errors
  (dot-
ted
  red
  lines).
  In
  the
  upper
  middle
  graph,
  the
  red,
  cyan
  and
  purple
lines
  correspond
  to
  photoreceptor
  activity
  over
  an
  array
  of
  17
  sen-
sory
  inputs:
  only
  the
  middle
  three
  inputs
  show
  activity
  because
the
  target
  is
  well-ﬁxated.
  In
  the
  upper
  left
  graph,
  the
  propriocep-
tive
  predictions
  (blue
  lines)
  reﬂect
  veridical
  pursuit;
  even
  during
occlusion
  when
  visual
  input
  disappears.
  These
  sensory
  predictions
are
  based
  upon
  the
  expectations
  of
  hidden
  oculomotor
  (blue
  line)
and
  target
  (red
  line)
  angular
  displacements
  shown
  on
  the
  lower
left.
  In
  the
  lower
  middle
  graph,
  the
  green
  (oculomotor)
  and
  cyan
(target)
 lines
 are
 the
 corresponding
 velocities.
 The
 grey
 regions
 cor-
respond
  to
  90%
  Bayesian
  conﬁdence
  intervals.
  Note
  the
  increase
in
  uncertainty
  about
  the
  location
  of
  the
  target
  during
  periods
  of
occlusion.
  The
  hidden
  cause
  of
  these
  displacements
  (broken
  black
line)
  is
  shown
  with
  its
  conditional
  expectation
  (blue
  line)
  in
  the
lower
  right
  panel.
  The
  true
  cause
  and
  action
  are
  shown
  on
  the
upper
 right.
 The
 action
 (blue
 line)
 is
 responsible
 for
 oculomotor
 dis-
placements
  and
  is
  driven
  by
  proprioceptive
  prediction
  errors
  (red
lines
  in
  the
  upper
  left
  panel).
  This
  dependency
  of
  action
  on
  propri-
oceptive
  prediction
  errors
  effectively
  closes
  the
  action
  perception
loop.
The
  ensuing
  target
  trajectory
  and
  pursuit
  is
  shown
  in
  Fig.
  4
(upper
  row).
  The
  upper
  left
  panel
  shows
  the
  trajectory
  of
  the
  target
(broken
  black
  line)
  and
  the
  centre
  of
  gaze
  (red
  line).
  The
  difference
between
  these
  angular
  displacements
  is
  the
  position
  error
  on
  the
upper
  right.
  The
  values
  of
  the
  parameters
  in
  Table
  1
  were
  chosen
to
  produce
  movements
  that
  caricature
  normal
  pursuit.
  Examples
of
  real
  trajectories
  and
  position
  errors
  are
  shown
  in
  the
  lower
  left
and
  right
  panels
  respectively
  (normalised
  with
  respect
  to
  time
  and
displacement).
  These
  are
  the
  averaged
  responses
  under
  different
experimental
  conditions
  that
  will
  be
  analysed
  later.
  Both
  the
  simu-
lated
  and
  empirical
  pursuit
  trajectories
  show
  a
  deviation
  from
  the
true
 target
 trajectory
 after
 it
 passes
 behind
 an
 occluder
 (the
 vertical
broken
  lines),
  which
  is
  corrected
  when
  the
  target
  re-emerges.
  This
correction
  generally
  produces
  an
  overshoot.
These
  simulations
  reproduce
  Bayes-optimal
  (grand
  averaged)
eye
  movements,
  given
  a
  smoothly
  moving
  target
  trajectory.
  This
Bayesian
  optimality
  rests
  upon
  the
  particular
  generative
  model
used
  for
  active
  inference
  and
  its
  parameters
  that
  encode
  beliefs
about
  how
  targets
  move
  –
  and
  induce
  eye
  movements.
  We
  are
  now
in
  a
  position
  to
  use
  this
  model
  to
  generate
  predictions
  of
  subject
behaviour
  and
  optimise
  the
  model
  parameters.
  These
  parameters
fall
  into
  three
  sets
  (see
  Table
  1):
  the
  parameters
  of
  visual
  kinetics;
the
  expected
  log
  precisions
  and
  prior
  beliefs
  about
  the
  invisible
attracting
  location
  trajectory.
Our
  primary
  focus
  in
  what
  follows
  is
  on
  the
  expected
  log
  pre-
cisions
  and
  how
  they
  are
  affected
  by
  experimental
  context.
  Note
that
  we
  are
  not
  determining
  how
  the
  precision
  parameters
  ought
to
  change
  in
  response
  to
  changes
  in
  target
  characteristics:
  we
  are
estimating
  how
  they
  actually
  change.
  This
  is
  important
  because
changes
  in
  hierarchical
  precision
  in
  a
  generative
  model
  of
  noisy
target
  motion
  may
  not
  just
  reﬂect
  but
  also
  compensate
  for
  changes
in
  the
  precision
  of
  the
  target.
  We
  now
  turn
  to
  the
  nature
  of
  this
estimation
  using
  dynamic
  causal
  modelling.R.A.
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Fig.
  4.
  Simulated
  and
  empirical
  tracking.
  The
  target
  pursuit
  produced
  by
  the
  action
  simulated
  in
  the
  previous
  ﬁgure
  is
  shown
  in
  the
  upper
  panels.
  The
  upper
  left
  panel
  shows
the
  trajectory
  of
  the
  target
  (broken
  black
  line)
  and
  the
  centre
  of
  gaze
  (red
  line).
  The
  difference
  between
  these
  angular
  displacements
  (eye
  position–target
  position)
  is
  the
pursuit
  position
  error
  on
  the
  upper
  right.
  The
  presence
  of
  the
  occluder
  is
  indicated
  by
  the
  grey
  blocks.
  The
  grand
  averaged
  and
  normalised
  empirical
  trajectories
  and
  position
errors
  for
  all
  four
  conditions
  are
  shown
  in
  the
  lower
  left
  and
  right
  panels
  respectively.
  Note
  that
  the
  position
  error
  reverses
  sign
  halfway
  through
  the
  sinusoid;
  i.e.,
  the
  eye
is
  always
  ahead
  of
  the
  target
  during
  occlusion
  in
  the
  ‘smooth’
  condition
  (red
  and
  green
  lines).
  ‘AS’
  denotes
  its
  anticipatory
  saccadic
  movement,
  and
  ‘lag’
  its
  lag
  behind
  the
target.
2.3.
  Dynamic
  causal
  modelling
  of
  eye
  movements
In
  this
  section,
  we
  brieﬂy
  review
  the
  concept
  of
  ‘meta-Bayesian’
modelling,
 model
 inversion
 using
 dynamic
 causal
 modelling
 (DCM)
and
  DCM’s
  application
  to
  eye
  movements.
  The
  modelling
  in
  this
study
  can
  be
  regarded
  as
  ‘meta-Bayesian’
  because
  we
  are
  using
Bayes’
  rule
  twice.
  First,
  we
  assume
  that
  our
  subjects
  are
  engag-
ing
  in
  active
  Bayesian
  inference
  using
  a
  generative
  model
  of
  their
sensations
  p(s| s,
 ms),
  with
  parameters
   s (including
  hidden
  states
and
  causes)
  of
  their
  (subjective)
  model
  ms:
p(s| s,
 ms)
  =
  N(Gs( s),
 ˙( s))
  (16)
Gs denotes
  the
  non-linear
  mapping
  from
  the
  model
  parameters
  to
sensory
 input,
 which
 is
 subject
 to
 Gaussian
 noise.
 Given
 the
 sensory
data
  they
  observe
  (Eq.
  (16))
  we
  can
  emulate
  the
  Bayesian
  updates
to
  their
  beliefs
  (Eq.
  (17)):
p( s|s,
 ms)
  =
p(s| s,
 ms)p( s|ms)
p(s|ms)
(17)
We
  can
  also
  emulate
  their
  Bayes-optimal
  action
  a* which
  max-
imises
  model
  evidence:
a∗ =
  arg
  max
a
p(s|ms)
  (18)
This
 subjective
 model
 (Eqs.
 (16)–(18))
 is
 then
 absorbed
 into
 an
 objec-
tive
 model
 mo of
 their
 behaviour
 (Daunizeau
 et
 al.,
 2010),
 illustrated
formally
  in
  Eqs.
  (19)–(21):
p(a| o,
  s,
 ms,
 mo)
  =
  N(Go( o,
 a∗( s)),
 ˙( o))
  (19)
p( o,
  s|a,
 ms,
 mo)
  =
p(a| o,
  s,
 ms,
 mo)p( o,
  s|ms,
 mo)
p(a|ms,
 mo)
(20)
 ∗
s =
  arg
  max
 s
p(a|ms,
 mo)
  (21)
This
  enables
  one
  to
  estimate
  the
  parameters
  (e.g.
  the
  precision)
of
  subjective
  beliefs
  given
  the
  behaviour
  observed
  by
  the
  experi-
menter.
For
  timeseries
  data
  like
  eye
  tracking
  responses,
  Bayesian
  model
inversion
 usually
 calls
 on
 some
 form
 of
 dynamic
 causal
 modelling:
 a
Bayesian
  model
  inversion
  and
  selection
  scheme
  that
  uses
  standard
Bayesian
  (variational)
  procedures
  to
  estimate
  the
  parameters
  of
time
  series
  models
  –
  usually
  speciﬁed
  in
  terms
  of
  differential
  equa-
tions.
  These
  differential
  equations
  specify
  predicted
  observations
and
  form
  the
  basis
  of
  a
  likelihood
  model.
  The
  generative
  model
is
  completed
  by
  specifying
  prior
  beliefs
  about
  model
  parameters.
In
  our
  case,
  the
  predicted
  position
  error
  a
  =
  xo( s)
  −
  v
  +
  e,
  given
some
  generative
  model
  parameters,
  provides
  the
  likelihood
  of
  the
observed
  position
  error
  (averaged
  over
  multiple
  trials),
  under
  the
assumption
  of
  additive
  Gaussian
  noise
  e∼N(0,
 ˙( o)):
p(a| o,
  s,
 ms,
 m0)
  =
  N(a∗( s),
 ˙( o))
  (22)
a∗( s)
  =
  xo( s)
  −
  v
  (23)
Eq.
  (22)
  is
  from
  Eq.
  (19);
  it
  shows
  that
  the
  likelihood
  of
  the
  position
error
  depends
  on
  both
  the
  Bayes
  optimal
  position
  error
  predicted
by
  the
  subjective
  model
  and
  the
  observation
  noise.
  Notice
  that
  the
observation
  model
  Go =
  a∗( s)
  is
  very
  simple
  because
  the
  subjects’
behaviour
  is
  directly
  available
  for
  observation.
  Prior
  beliefs
  about
the
  parameters
  p( s|ms)
  then
  provide
  a
  full
  generative
  model
  of8
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observations,
  which
  can
  be
  inverted
  (see
  Eqs.
  (19)–(21)).
  Table
  1
contains
  the
  prior
  expectations,
  while
  the
  prior
  variance
  of
  the
  (log
scaling
  of
  the)
  parameters
  was
  set
  to
  one
  half.
  Note
  that
  these
  (rel-
atively
  uninformative)
  priors
  are
  our
  prior
  beliefs
  about
  the
  model
parameters
  that
  encode
  the
  subjective
  beliefs
  of
  the
  (grand
  aver-
aged)
  subject.
The
 inversion
 scheme
 used
 in
 this
 application
 is
 exactly
 the
 same
as
  the
  scheme
  used
  to
  invert
  dynamic
  causal
  models
  of
  fMRI
  and
EEG
 timeseries
 (see
 Friston
 et
 al.
 (2007),
 Friston
 et
 al.
 (2003),
 Kiebel
et
  al.
  (2009)
  for
  details).
  Interestingly,
  it
  is
  based
  upon
  the
  same
gradient
  descent
  that
  underlies
  the
  active
  inference
  scheme
  of
  the
previous
  section;
  however
  here,
  the
  posterior
  expectations
  of
  the
parameters
  ( ∗
o,
  ∗
s)
  =
   ∗ =
  E[ |a,
 v,
 ms]
  optimise
  the
  free
  energy
  of
observed
  position
  errors
  such
  that
  it
  approximates
  the
  log
  model
evidence:
F(a,
  ∗)
  ≈
  −ln
 p(a|v,
 ms)
  (24)
This
  log-evidence
  can
  then
  be
  used
  to
  compare
  different
  models
in
  terms
  of
  their
  likelihood
  –
  or
  to
  perform
  Bayesian
  model
  aver-
aging.
  Bayesian
  model
  averaging
  is
  essentially
  a
  way
  of
  estimating
the
  parameters
  that
  relaxes
  assumptions
  about
  a
  particular
  model
being
  the
  correct
  model.
  This
  is
  achieved
  by
  weighting
  the
  value
  of
a
  particular
  model’s
  parameters
  by
  the
  likelihood
  of
  that
  model.
In
  what
  follows,
  we
  will
  consider
  a
  large
  number
  of
  models
  that
do
 or
 do
 not
 allow
 for
 changes
 in
 various
 parameters.
 We
 will
 assess
the
 evidence
 for
 (changes
 in)
 a
 particular
 model
 parameter
 in
 terms
of
  the
  log-evidence
  of
  models
  that
  do
  and
  do
  not
  contain
  (changes
in)
 that
 parameter.
 Finally,
 we
 will
 characterise
 the
 effects
 of
 exper-
imental
  manipulations
  on
  parameters
  using
  the
  Bayesian
  model
averages
  over
  all
  possible
  models.
All
  of
  the
  analysis
  software
  used
  in
  this
  paper
  and
  a
sample
  dataset
  is
  available
  as
  part
  of
  the
  SPM
  software
(www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm),
  in
  the
  SPEM
  and
  DCM
  toolbox:
  the
(annotated)
  demo
  routine
  is
  spm
  SEM
  demo.m.
  A
  more
  generic
meta-Bayesian
  modelling
  routine
  (for
  eye
  movements
  but
  gener-
alisable
  to
  other
  contexts)
  is
  called
  spm
  meta
  model.m
  and
  can
  be
found
  in
  the
  DEM
  toolbox.
  The
  integration
  of
  the
  active
  inference
scheme
  and
  subsequent
  dynamic
  causal
  modelling
  used
  a
  local
  lin-
earisation
  scheme
  (Ozaki,
  1992)
  as
  implemented
  in
  spm
  ADEM.m
and
  spm
  nlsi
  GN.m.
2.4.
  Experimental
  paradigm
In
  this
  section,
  we
  describe
  the
  experimental
  paradigm
  used
to
  generate
  pursuit
  movements,
  whose
  averages
  are
  modelled
  in
terms
  of
  active
  inference.
  Our
  intention
  here
  was
  to
  try
  to
  induce
–
  in
  normal
  brains
  –
  hierarchical
  changes
  in
  subjective
  precision
that
  we
  have
  proposed
  in
  schizophrenia
  (as
  a
  result
  of
  NMDA-
R
  hypofunction
  in
  prefrontal
  cortex:
  (Adams
  et
  al.,
  2013b).
  This
putative
  manipulation
  of
  expected
  or
  subjective
  precision
  rests
  on
exploiting
 (Bayes)
 optimal
 neuronal
 processing
 of
 different
 stimuli.
In
  brief,
  normal
  subjects
  pursued
  a
  sinusoidal
  target
  moving
behind
  a
  visual
  occluder
  under
  two
  levels
  of
  two
  experimental
  fac-
tors.
  The
  ﬁrst
  factor
  changed
  the
  precision
  of
  the
  velocity
  of
  the
target
  –
  by
  making
  the
  sinusoidal
  motion
  noisy.
  The
  second
  factor
was
  the
  speed
  of
  the
  sinusoidal
  motion.
  Our
  initial
  hypothesis
  was
that
  decreasing
  the
  precision
  of
  the
  velocity
  would
  decrease
  the
precision
  of
  hidden
  states
  and
  causes
   x,
   v,
  relative
  to
  sensory
precision
   s.
  Conversely,
  we
  conjectured
  that
  the
  speed
  manipu-
lation
  would
  induce
  a
  change
  in
  the
  kinetic
  parameters
  but
  not
  the
precision
  parameters.
  In
  fact,
  these
  hypotheses
  were
  rather
  naive
and
  we
  obtained
  some
  rather
  surprising
  results
  that,
  in
  retrospect,
we
  could
  have
  anticipated.
We
  acquired
  pursuit
  data
  from
  8
  healthy
  human
  subjects
  (mean
age
  27.1
  years,
  2
  female).
  All
  subjects
  were
  naïve
  to
  ocular
  pursuit
tasks,
  had
  normal
  or
  corrected-to-normal
  vision
  and
  gave
  written
informed
  consent.
  The
  study
  was
  approved
  by
  UCL
  Ethics
  commit-
tee
  (1825/003).
  The
  experimental
  protocol
  was
  written
  in
  Matlab,
using
  the
  Psychophysics
  and
  Eyelink
  Toolbox
  extensions
  (Brainard,
1997;
  Cornelissen
  et
  al.,
  2002)
  and
  Cogent
  2000,
  developed
  by
  the
Cogent
 2000
 team
 at
 the
 WTCN
 and
 ICN,
 and
 Cogent
 Graphics
 devel-
oped
  by
  John
  Romaya.
Each
  subject
  sat
  in
  an
  enclosed
  and
  darkened
  room,
  with
  their
head
  stabilised
  using
  a
  chin
  rest
  and
  head
  abutments.
  The
  target
was
 displayed
 on
 a
 41
 cm
 by
 30
 cm
 DELL
 UltraSharp
 2408WFPb
 LCD
ﬂat
  screen
  monitor,
  60
 cm
  from
  the
  subject.
  The
  target
  consisted
  of
a
 black
 dot
 (2
 mm
 across)
 surrounded
 by
 a
 white
 ring
 (3.5
 mm
 radial
width)
  moving
  over
  a
  black
  background.
  Total
  target
  diameter
  was
9
 mm
  or
  0.86◦ visual
  angle.
  Target
  luminance
  was
  18
 cd/m2 and
background
  luminance
  was
  0.01
 cd/m2.
The
  target
  moved
  along
  a
  horizontal
  plane,
  halfway
  up
  the
screen
  over
  75%
  of
  the
  screen
  width
  (28.8◦ of
  visual
  angle).
  At
  the
beginning
  of
  each
  trial,
  the
  target
  stimulus
  appeared
  at
  either
  the
left
  or
  right
  end
  of
  its
  path,
  and
  remained
  stationary
  for
  1–3
 s
  (the
precise
 time
 varied
 randomly).
 The
 target
 then
 moved
 horizontally,
its
  velocity
  varying
  sinusoidally.
  One
  trial
  consisted
  of
  three
  full
cycles
  of
  motion.
  In
  each
  trial,
  the
  target
  was
  occluded
  between
the
  midline
  and
  the
  furthest
  10%
  of
  the
  path
  from
  where
  the
  target
started;
  i.e.,
  for
  40%
  (11.5◦)
  of
  the
  total
  path,
  twice
  per
  cycle.
  The
occluder
  was
  the
  same
  colour
  as
  the
  background.
Two
  variables
  were
  varied
  independently
  in
  a
  2
 ×
 2
  factorial
design:
  the
  period
  of
  the
  cycle,
  and
  the
  smoothness
  of
  the
  motion.
Two
  different
  periods
  were
  used,
  of
  4.173
 s
  and
  5.1
 s,
  whose
  maxi-
mum
  velocities
  were
  21◦/s
  and
  17.2◦/s,
  and
  in
  which
  the
  occluded
periods
  lasted
  615
 ms
  and
  752
 ms
  respectively.
  We
  refer
  to
  these
conditions
  as
  ‘Fast’
  and
  ‘Slow’,
  although
  compared
  with
  most
  pur-
suit
  experiments
  these
  maximum
  velocities
  are
  moderate
  to
  fast.
In
  the
  ‘Smooth’
  motion
  condition,
  the
  target
  moved
  sinusoidally.
  In
the
  ‘Noisy’
  motion
  condition,
  a
  Gaussian
  random
  walk
  of
  variance
 
  =
  exp(−0.5)
  was
  added
  to
  the
  phase
  of
  the
  target
  motion,
  such
that:
x(t)
  =
  cos(2 f
 (t
  +
   (t)))
 (t)
  =
   (t
  −
  1)
  +
  ω(t)
ω(t)∼N(0,
  2)
(25)
Here
  f
  is
  the
  target
  frequency
  and
  t
  the
  time
  in
  milliseconds.
  This
created
 rapid
 ﬂuctuations
 around
 an
 underlying
 sinusoidal
 motion,
which
  had
  the
  same
  period
  as
  the
  Smooth
  trajectory.
  The
  ensuing
ﬂuctuations
  were
  too
  fast
  to
  be
  tracked
  with
  the
  eyes,
  and
  subjects
were
 instructed
 to
 follow
 the
 ‘average’
 position
 of
 the
 target,
 rather
than
  the
  ﬂuctuations
  themselves.
  Subjects
  were
  explicitly
  asked
  to
maintain
 pursuit
 and
 not
 to
 saccade
 to
 the
 side
 of
 the
 occluder.
 Note
that
  the
  observer
  model
  (Fig.
  2,
  or
  Eqs.
  (10)–(15))
  does
  not
  contain
a
  model
  of
  this
  stochastic
  process,
  because
  we
  wish
  to
  see
  whether
Noisy
  motion
  impacts
  upon
  the
  precision
  parameters
  in
  particular.
The
 experiment
 consisted
 of
 12
 blocks
 of
 4
 trials,
 such
 that
 there
were
  12
  trials
  (36
  cycles)
  of
  each
  of
  the
  four
  conditions.
  Fast
  and
Slow
  stimuli
  were
  presented
  in
  the
  ﬁrst
  and
  second
  halves
  of
  the
experiment.
  Smooth
  and
  Noisy
  stimuli
  were
  presented
  in
  pseudo-
random
  order,
  such
  that
  every
  eight
  trials
  contained
  four
  of
  each.
Eye
  movement
  data
  –
  including
  horizontal
  and
  vertical
  eye
movements
  and
  pupil
  diameter
  –
  were
  collected
  using
  an
  infrared
eyetracker
  (Eyelink
  1000,
  SR
  Research,
  Ontario,
  Canada),
  sampling
at
  1000
 Hz.
  The
  eyetracker
  was
  recalibrated
  using
  an
  automated
calibration
  routine
  after
  every
  block
  of
  4
  trials;
  this
  entailed
  the
presentation
  of
  a
  5
 mm
  white
  circular
  target
  stimulus
  at
  ±14◦ hor-
izontal,
  ±10◦ vertical
  and
  0◦ of
  visual
  angle,
  until
  the
  calibration
error
  was
  <1◦.
  The
  stored
  .edf
  ﬁles
  were
  converted
  into
  ASCII
  and
imported
  into
  Matlab.
  The
  pursuit
  trajectory
  root
  mean
  square
errors
  were
  calculated
  for
  each
  cycle,
  and
  those
  over
  3.8
 cm
  were
visually
  inspected.
  If
  there
  was
  evidence
  of
  either
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problem
  or
  gross
  distortion
  from
  blinking
  (or
  complete
  failure
  to
track
 the
 target)
 the
 cycle
 was
 discarded
 (<10%
 total
 cycles
 were
 dis-
carded
 for
 any
 subject).
 The
 Slow
 condition
 data
 from
 three
 subjects
had
  to
  be
  discarded
  for
  technical
  reasons
  (archiving
  problems).
Following
  the
  usual
  procedure
  in
  the
  dynamic
  causal
  modelling
of
  ERPs
  (e.g.,
  Garrido
  et
  al.,
  2008),
  we
  used
  the
  grand
  average
  pur-
suit
 trajectories
 (over
 cycles
 and
 subjects)
 as
 (precise)
 data
 features
that
  would
  inform
  our
  Bayesian
  model
  comparison
  –
  in
  which
  we
hoped
  to
  ﬁnd
  evidence
  for
  condition-speciﬁc
  effects
  on
  the
  encod-
ing
  of
  precision.
  Note
  that
  this
  inference
  goes
  much
  further
  than
simply
  demonstrating
  signiﬁcant
  differences
  between
  conditions
(e.g.,
  in
  relation
  to
  intertrial
  or
  intersubject
  variability).
  The
  grand
averages
  were
  normalised
  so
  that
  they
  corresponded
  to
  a
  single
cycle
  of
  target
  motion
  with
  unit
  amplitude:
  this
  allows
  us
  to
  com-
pare
  responses
  from
  experimental
  setups
  with
  different
  screen
sizes
  and
  distances
  between
  the
  screen
  and
  the
  subject
  (e.g.,
  in
  our
subsequent
  MEG
  experiment).
  The
  grand
  averages
  were
  then
  sub-
ject
  to
  dynamic
  causal
  modelling,
  allowing
  all
  (kinetic,
  precision
and
 prior)
 parameters
 (except
 viscosity
 parameters)
 to
 change
 with
the
  two
  (motion
  noise
  and
  speed)
  experimental
  factors.
  Nonneg-
ative
  precision
  and
  prior
  parameters
  were
  estimated
  in
  terms
  of
their
  log
  scaling
  –
  such
  that
  a
  value
  of
  0
  corresponds
  to
  a
  scaling
by
  exp(0)
 =
 1
  or
  no
  change
  from
  the
  prior
  expectations
  in
  Table
  1.
In
  addition
  to
  estimating
  these
  parameters,
  we
  also
  estimated
  the
changes
  induced
  by
  changing
  target
  motion
  noise
  or
  speed.
Notice
  that
  in
  this
  particular
  application,
  we
  are
  estimating
  the
parameters
  that
  explain
  the
  average
  response
  to
  multiple
  noisy
trajectories.
  This
  is
  not
  the
  same
  as
  the
  average
  of
  the
  parame-
ters
  underlying
  the
  response
  to
  each
  trajectory.
  In
  other
  words,
  the
parameters
 of
 the
 average
 response
 are
 not
 the
 average
 parameters
of
 the
 responses
 because
 the
 parameters
 are
 a
 nonlinear
 function
 of
observed
  responses.
  The
  advantage
  of
  using
  the
  response
  average
is
  that
  we
  can
  use
  a
  deterministic
  generative
  model
  that
  does
  not
have
  to
  consider
  random
  or
  stochastic
  ﬂuctuations
  introduced
  by
noisy
  target
  motion
  (or
  eye
  movements).
As
  noted
  by
  one
  of
  our
  reviewers,
  it
  is
  possible
  in
  theory
  to
compare
  averaged
  eye
  trajectories
  from
  the
  start
  of
  the
  experi-
ment
  with
  those
  from
  the
  end,
  to
  investigate
  the
  timescale
  over
which
  model
  parameters
  are
  learned.
  In
  this
  paradigm,
  however,
subjects
  become
  familiar
  with
  the
  sinusoidal
  motion
  and
  ampli-
tude,
  occluder
  position
  and
  motion
  noise
  within
  a
  few
  trials,
  and
  so
comparing
  averages
  of
  trials
  1–8
  and
  17–24
  may
  not
  be
  the
  opti-
mal
 way
 to
 assess
 learning
 (averaging
 fewer
 trials
 makes
 parameter
estimation
  difﬁcult
  as
  individual
  trials
  are
  quite
  noisy
  –
  see
  Fig.
  5):
a
  different
  paradigm
  may
  be
  more
  suitable
  to
  characterise
  learning
per
  se.
3.
  Results
  and
  discussion
A
  sample
  subject’s
  unnormalised
  eye
  trajectories
  in
  the
  Fast
  and
Slow
  conditions
  –
  before
  averaging
  –
  are
  shown
  in
  the
  upper
  and
lower
  panels
  of
  Fig.
  5,
  respectively.
  The
  normalised
  grand
  averaged
empirical
  eye
  trajectories
  are
  shown
  at
  the
  bottom
  left
  of
  Fig.
  4,
together
  with
  the
  position
  errors
  (difference
  between
  the
  eye
  and
the
  target)
  on
  the
  bottom
  right,
  for
  the
  four
  conditions
  of
  our
  two
factor
  design;
  namely,
  Smooth
  versus
  Noisy
  and
  Slow
  versus
  Fast.
Fig.
  6
  shows
  the
  same
  observed
  trajectories
  and
  position
  errors
(top
  panels)
  and
  the
  predicted
  trajectories
  (middle
  left
  panel)
  and
position
  errors
  (middle
  right
  panel).
  The
  predicted
  responses
  were
based
  upon
  the
  posterior
  expectations
  of
  the
  parameters
  after
Bayesian
  model
  averaging.
  This
  averaging
  used
  post
  hoc
  model
optimisation
  (Friston
  and
  Penny,
  2011),
  in
  which
  the
  evidence
(marginal
  likelihood)
  for
  many
  models
  with
  reduced
  numbers
  of
parameters
 is
 computed
 from
 the
 posterior
 density
 over
 the
 param-
eters
  of
  the
  full
  model.
  Free
  parameters
  can
  then
  be
  removed
  from
the
  full
  model
  using
  very
  precise
  shrinkage
  priors.
  The
  lower
  panel
of
  Fig.
  6
  shows
  the
  posterior
  expectations
  of
  the
  model
  parameters
(averaged
 over
 the
 four
 conditions).
 Condition
 speciﬁc
 changes
 due
to
  target
  motion
  noise
  and
  speed
  are
  shown
  in
  Fig.
  7.
  The
  parame-
ters
  are
  shown
  in
  the
  same
  order
  presented
  in
  Table
  1.
  For
  clarity,
the
  log-precision
  parameters
  are
  shown
  in
  teal
  –
  separating
  the
kinetic
  parameters
  from
  the
  prior
  parameters.
  The
  pink
  bars
  corre-
spond
 to
 90%
 Bayesian
 conﬁdence
 intervals.
 Note
 that
 the
 precision
and
  prior
  parameters
  are
  log
  scale
  parameters.
We
  ﬁrst
  comment
  on
  the
  empirical
  trajectories.
  In
  keeping
  with
previous
  work
  on
  the
  oculomotor
  response
  to
  the
  predictable
  dis-
appearance
  and
  reappearance
  of
  a
  target
  (Bennett
  and
  Barnes,
2003;
  Orban
  de
  Xivry
  et
  al.,
  2009),
  target
  occlusion
  causes
  an
  antic-
ipatory
  saccadic
  movement
  followed
  by
  a
  loss
  of
  eye
  velocity,
  seen
in
  the
  averaged
  position
  errors
  (Fig.
  4,
  lower
  right
  panel
  –
  ‘AS’)
  as
abrupt
  advances
  in
  eye
  position
  ahead
  of
  the
  target
  shortly
  after
its
  occlusion
  begins
  and
  before
  any
  lag
  (on
  average)
  develops.
  The
only
  exceptions
  to
  this
  pattern
  are
  the
  traces
  behind
  the
  ﬁrst
  occlu-
sion
  in
  the
  Noisy
  conditions,
  whose
  anticipatory
  movements
  do
not
  (on
  average)
  get
  ahead
  of
  the
  target
  because
  they
  are
  smaller,
later
  and
  occur
  in
  the
  context
  of
  greater
  lag.
  After
  the
  anticipatory
saccade,
  a
  low
  velocity
  is
  maintained
  such
  that
  when
  the
  target
reappears
  the
  eye
  is
  now
  behind
  it.
  Thereafter,
  the
  lag
  is
  corrected
with
  varying
  success.
  The
  residual
  pursuit
  velocities
  (the
  averaged
eye
  velocity
  during
  the
  latter
  half
  of
  target
  occlusion,
  once
  sac-
cades
  of
  >35◦/s
  were
  excluded
  from
  the
  data
  –
  not
  shown)
  were
almost
 identical
 for
 both
 Smooth
 and
 Noisy
 conditions
 and
 Fast
 and
Slow
  speeds:
  around
  −3◦/s
  when
  the
  eye
  was
  decelerating
  during
the
  ﬁrst
  occlusion,
  and
  around
  5◦/s
  when
  accelerating
  during
  the
second
  occlusion.
We
  now
  turn
  to
  the
  condition-speciﬁc
  effects.
  In
  brief,
  the
  effect
of
  rendering
  the
  sensory
  information
  imprecise
  or
  noisy
  –
  the
difference
  between
  the
  Smooth
  (red
  and
  green)
  and
  Noisy
  (blue
and
  cyan)
  trajectories
  –
  appears
  to
  be
  greater
  than
  the
  difference
between
  Slow
  (red
  and
  blue)
  and
  Fast
  (green
  and
  cyan)
  pursuits.
The
  effect
  of
  making
  the
  stimulus
  noisier
  is
  generally
  to
  increase
the
  lag
  of
  the
  eye
  behind
  the
  target.
  This
  is
  most
  marked
  during
  the
ﬁrst
  occlusion
  (in
  each
  cycle)
  and
  following
  the
  second
  occlusion
–
  although
  during
  the
  saccade
  in
  the
  second
  occlusion
  this
  effect
momentarily
 disappears.
 As
 noted
 by
 one
 of
 our
 reviewers,
 we
 were
using
  an
  LCD
  monitor
  which
  is
  susceptible
  to
  motion
  blur
  (Elze
  and
Tanner,
  2012).
  In
  principle,
  the
  observed
  lag
  in
  the
  Noisy
  condi-
tion
  may
  be
  due
  to
  a
  target
  motion
  blur;
  however,
  contribution
of
  motion
  blur
  is
  probably
  very
  small
  because
  the
  biggest
  lag
  we
observed
  was
  during
  the
  ﬁrst
  occlusion,
  when
  no
  target
  is
  visible.
Conversely,
  the
  effect
  of
  increasing
  the
  speed
  of
  the
  target
appears
  to
  interact
  with
  the
  presence
  of
  Noisy
  motion.
  Increasing
the
  speed
  of
  the
  Smooth
  target
  has
  little
  effect,
  other
  than
  slightly
increasing
  the
  degree
  to
  which
  saccades
  or
  subsequent
  slowing
  of
pursuit
  overshoot
  the
  target
  before
  they
  are
  corrected.
  Increasing
the
  speed
  of
  the
  Noisy
  target
  does
  not
  have
  this
  effect,
  but
  instead
compounds
  the
  effect
  of
  Noisy
  motion
  by
  increasing
  the
  lag
  of
  eye
behind
  target,
  when
  the
  latter
  is
  visible.
Comparing
  the
  empirical
  and
  predicted
  position
  errors
  (Fig.
  6,
middle
  and
  top
  right
  panels)
  shows
  a
  reasonable,
  if
  not
  perfect,
agreement.
  Most
  of
  the
  deviations
  from
  the
  target
  trajectory
  have
been
  reproduced
  –
  and,
  in
  particular,
  the
  quantitative
  differences
induced
 by
 changing
 target
 motion
 noise
 or
 speed.
 The
 bottom
 pan-
els
  in
  Fig.
  6
  display
  the
  posterior
  expectations
  of
  the
  parameters
(averaged
  over
  conditions).
  The
  point
  to
  take
  from
  Fig.
  6
  is
  that
during
  pursuit
  of
  a
  predictable
  target,
  prior
  precision
  remains
  high
(ln
  v is
  unchanged
  at
  4)
  whereas
  motion
  and
  in
  particular
  sensory
precision
 are
 diminished
 (ln
  s drops
 to
 around
 1).
 In
 neurobiologi-
cal
 terms,
 this
 would
 mean
 that
 in
 (Bayes)
 optimal
 pursuit,
 subjects
are
 more
 conﬁdent
 about
 the
 underlying
 period
 of
 the
 target
 in
 rela-
tion
  to
  sensory
  information
  than
  the
  prior
  values
  we
  used
  would10
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Fig.
  5.
  Unnormalised
  trajectories
  from
  a
  sample
  subject.
  This
  ﬁgure
  illustrates
  all
  of
  the
  eye
  trajectories
  from
  a
  single
  subject,
  prior
  to
  their
  normalisation
  and
  averaging.
  The
upper
  panels
  depict
  the
  trajectories
  from
  the
  Fast
  condition
  and
  the
  lower
  panels
  those
  from
  the
  Slow
  condition.
  The
  occluders
  are
  shown
  as
  grey
  rectangles.
  It
  is
  clear
  even
from
  this
  raw
  data
  that
  the
  eye
  trajectories
  in
  the
  Noisy
  condition
  (blue
  lines)
  lag
  behind
  those
  in
  the
  Smooth
  condition
  (red
  lines),
  but
  the
  latter
  track
  the
  target
  (black
  line)
quite
  well.
  Note
  that
  the
  target
  line
  depicts
  the
  actual
  target
  position
  in
  the
  Smooth
  condition,
  but
  in
  the
  Noisy
  condition
  a
  Gaussian
  random
  walk
  was
  added
  to
  the
  phase
  of
the
  target
  (not
  shown).
  (For
  interpretation
  of
  the
  references
  to
  color
  in
  this
  ﬁgure
  legend,
  the
  reader
  is
  referred
  to
  the
  web
  version
  of
  this
  article.)
suggest.
  In
  cognitive
  terms,
  this
  means
  that
  subjects
  are
  attending
to
  the
  high
  level
  (global)
  Gestalt
  of
  motion
  and
  less
  to
  the
  local
  dis-
placement
  and
  velocity
  cues.
  Having
  noted
  this,
  we
  now
  turn
  to
  the
important
  results;
  namely
  the
  condition
  speciﬁc
  changes
  in
  these
parameters.
  These
  are
  shown
  in
  Fig.
  7
  using
  the
  same
  format
  as
Fig.
  6.
The
  most
  important
  point
  to
  note
  is
  that
  the
  biggest
  effects
  of
target
 motion
 noise
 –
 by
 far
 –
 are
 on
 the
 precision
 parameters
 (Fig.
 7
left
  panel,
  teal
  bars)
  relative
  to
  effects
  on
  kinetic
  and
  prior
  param-
eters
  (grey
  bars).
  Between
  Smooth
  and
  Noisy
  conditions,
  sensory
precision
  ln
  s and
  state
  precision
  ln
  x vary
  by
  a
  factor
  of
  roughly
exp
 (2)
2 ≈
  60.
  In
  comparison,
  the
  greatest
  change
  in
  the
  remaining
parameters
 is
 a
 kinetic
 parameter
  3,
 changing
 by
 a
 factor
 of
 14
 (see
Fig.
  7
  legend).
  This
  is
  interesting
  and
  consistent
  with
  our
  predic-
tions.
  In
  other
  words,
  the
  most
  parsimonious
  explanation
  for
  the
effect
  of
  changing
  target
  precision
  was,
  quantitatively,
  to
  change
the
  precision
  or
  conﬁdence
  evidenced
  by
  subjects
  in
  beliefs
  about
the
 motion
 of
 the
 target
 and
 their
 gaze.
 Having
 said
 this,
 the
 pattern
of
  changes
  in
  precision
  –
  both
  over
  experimental
  conditions
  and
levels
  of
  the
  generative
  model
  were
  not
  exactly
  what
  we
  predicted.
We
  had
  expected
  that
  introducing
  uncertainty
  into
  target
motion,
  by
  making
  it
  noisy,
  would
  suppress
  motion
  and
  prior
  pre-
cision
  (the
  second
  and
  third
  teal
  bars),
  and
  leave
  sensory
  precision
unchanged
  (the
  ﬁrst
  teal
  bar).
  However,
  the
  quantitative
  results
  of
the
  dynamic
  causal
  modelling
  suggest
  something
  slightly
  differ-
ent:
  it
  appears
  that
  subjects
  respond
  to
  Noisy
  target
  trajectories
  (at
either
  Fast
  or
  Slow
  speeds)
  by
  attending
  more
  closely
  to
  sensory
and
  motion
  information,
  while
  leaving
  prior
  precision
  unchanged.
As
  we
  predicted,
  there
  was
  a
  shift
  in
  the
  balance
  of
  precision
  away
from
  upper
  hierarchical
  levels
  (prior
  precision)
  and
  towards
  lower
hierarchical
  levels
  (sensory
  precision),
  but
  this
  came
  about
  due
  to
an
  increase
  in
  sensory
  precision
  rather
  than
  a
  decrease
  in
  prior
precision.
  In
  retrospect,
  this
  is
  a
  perfectly
  optimal
  response
  that
does
  not
  merely
  reﬂect
  but
  attempts
  to
  compensate
  for
  the
  loss
  of
precision
  about
  motion
  in
  the
  stimuli.
Here,
 we
 are
 interpreting
 the
 balance
 between
 sensory
 and
 prior
precision
  in
  terms
  of
  attention:
  in
  predictive
  coding,
  attention
  can
be
  modelled
  in
  a
  fairly
  straightforward
  way
  through
  a
  hierarchical
optimisation
  of
  expected
  precision.
  This
  reproduces
  both
  sensory
phenomena
  –
  like
  biased
  competition
  –
  and
  the
  psychophysics
  of
the
  Posner
  paradigm
  (see
  (Feldman
  and
  Friston,
  2010)
  for
  details).
The
  attentional
  interpretation
  of
  precision
  also
  echoes
  the
  notion
of
  ‘gain
  control’
  in
  movement
  being
  a
  form
  of
  ‘motor
  attention’
(Lisberger,
  2010;
  Brown
  et
  al.,
  2011).
  In
  our
  context,
  it
  appears
that
  subjects
  respond
  to
  noisy
  stimuli
  by
  directing
  attention
  to
  the
stimulus
  (i.e.
  increasing
  sensory
  precision),
  rather
  than
  suppress-
ing
  conﬁdence
  in
  prior
  beliefs
  about
  its
  motion.
  This
  maintenance
of
  prior
  precision
  is
  consistent
  with
  the
  observation
  that
  increasing
target
 motion
 noise
 had
 no
 effect
 on
 residual
 (saccade-free)
 pursuit
velocity
  (RPV)
  during
  occlusion:
  had
  prior
  precision
  decreased,
  we
would
  have
  expected
  a
  lower
  RPV
  during
  occlusion,
  as
  we
  have
shown
  in
  previous
  modelling
  work
  (Adams
  et
  al.,
  2012)
  –
  and
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Fig.
  6.
  Empirical
  and
  predicted
  tracking.
  This
  ﬁgure
  reports
  the
  observed
  and
  predicted
  trajectories
  (upper
  left
  panels)
  and
  position
  errors
  (upper
  right
  panels)
  for
  the
  four
conditions
  of
  our
  two
  factor
  design;
  namely,
  Smooth
  versus
  Noisy
  and
  Slow
  versus
  Fast.
  The
  predicted
  (average)
  responses
  were
  based
  upon
  the
  posterior
  expectations
  of
the
  parameters
  of
  the
  generative
  model
  described
  in
  Fig.
  2.
  The
  lower
  panel
  of
  Fig.
  5
  shows
  the
  posterior
  expectations
  of
  the
  model
  parameters
  (averaged
  over
  conditions),
plotted
  as
  the
  changes
  from
  prior
  expectations
  listed
  in
  Table
  1,
  and
  shown
  in
  the
  same
  order.
  For
  clarity,
  the
  precision
  parameters
  are
  shown
  in
  teal
  –
  separating
  the
  kinetic
(eye
  movement)
  parameters
  from
  the
  prior
  (target
  movement)
  parameters.
  The
  pink
  bars
  correspond
  to
  90%
  Bayesian
  conﬁdence
  intervals.
is
  found
  in
  many
  studies
  of
  schizophrenic
  SPEM
  (O’Driscoll
  and
Callahan,
  2008).
As
 predicted,
 target
 speed
 has
 no
 effect
 on
 precision
 parameters:
the
  conﬁdence
  intervals
  around
  the
  small
  increase
  in
  prior
  preci-
sion
  span
  zero
  (Fig.
  7).
  Instead,
  the
  only
  changes
  were
  to
  the
  kinetic
parameter
   4 and
  prior
  parameter
   8,
  suggesting
  that
  increasing
target
 speed
 increased
 the
 ‘pull’
 of
 the
 eye
 to
 the
 attracting
 location
when
  behind
  the
  occluder
  (i.e.
  saccades
  were
  faster)
  and
  increased
the
 phase
 lag
 between
 the
 target
 and
 the
 attracting
 location,
 respec-
tively.
The
  effects
  of
  target
  motion
  noise
  on
  the
  kinetic
  parameters
are
  best
  expressed
  in
  terms
  of
  the
  overall
  weighting
  of
  the
  eye’s
attraction
  to
  the
  target
   t or
  attracting
  location
   v (calculated
from
  the
  other
  kinetic
  parameter
  estimates:
  Eqs.
  (14)
  and
  (15)).
 v always
  increases
  during
  target
  occlusion–from
  around
  1/6
  to
1/4
  in
  each
  condition
  –
  as
  we
  expected.
  We
  had
  anticipated
  that
 t would
  always
  decrease
  during
  target
  occlusion,
  but
  in
  fact
  this
only
  occurred
  during
  Noisy
  trials
  (from
  around
  −1/3
  to
  −1/2):
  the
amount
  of
  anticipatory
  saccadic
  movements
  during
  target
  occlu-
sion
  in
  Smooth
  trials
  could
  only
  be
  explained
  by
  increases
  in
  both
 v and
   t (from
  around
  −1/8
  to
  1/16).
  Having
  said
  this,
  the
  kinetic
parameters
  were
  not
  our
  focus
  –
  their
  raison
  d’être
  was
  to
  optimise
our
  estimates
  of
  subjective
  expected
  precision.
Our
  next
  goal
  will
  be
  to
  show
  that
  these
  precision
  estimates
correlate
  with
  measures
  of
  neural
  activity,
  and
  thus
  establish
  their
construct
  validity.
  In
  other
  words,
  we
  hope
  to
  use
  the
  current
  DCM12
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Fig.
  7.
  Context
  dependent
  parameter
  changes.
  These
  panels
  show
  the
  changes
  in
  parameters
  due
  to
  the
  effect
  of
  increasing
  the
  noise
  of
  target
  motion
  (left)
  and
  its
  speed
(right).
  The
  graphs
  plot
  the
  changes
  in
  parameters
  from
  baseline
  with
  (+)
  and
  without
  (−)
  changes
  in
  noise
  or
  speed:
  the
  changes
  in
  kinetic
  parameters
  are
  absolute,
  but
changes
  in
  precision
  and
  prior
  parameters
  are
  log
  scaling
  factors.
  Thus
  moving
  from
  Smooth
  to
  Noisy
  conditions
  increases
  ˘s by
  a
  factor
  of
  exp
 (2.2)
2 –
  from
  the
  left
panel.
  The
  precision
  parameters
  are
  shown
  in
  teal
  and
  the
  pink
  bars
  correspond
  to
  90%
  Bayesian
  conﬁdence
  intervals.
  The
  conﬁdence
  intervals
  around
  ˘v are
  very
  broad
because
  only
  large
  changes
  in
  ˘v have
  a
  substantial
  effect
  on
  eye
  motion.
  This
  means
  there
  is
  a
  lot
  of
  uncertainty
  about
  its
  expected
  value.
  For
  reference,
  absolute
  values
of
  posterior
  expectations
  in
  a
  given
  condition
  can
  be
  determined
  as
  follows.
  The
  changes
  in
  eye
  kinetics
  parameters
  ( 1,
 .
 .
 .,
  6)
  from
  priors
  to
  posteriors
  are
  absolute;
  e.g.
parameter
   3 had
  a
  prior
  expectation
  of
  0.5.
  Its
  posterior
  expectation
  is
  changed
  by
  −0.21
  (from
  Fig.
  5,
  bottom
  right
  panel),
  and
  target
  motion
  noise
  exerts
  a
  further
  effect
on
  this
  baseline
  of
  ±−0.34
  (from
  Fig.
  7,
  right
  panel)
  with
  no
  effect
  of
  target
  speed,
  hence
  in
  the
  Smooth
  condition
   3 =
  0.5
  −
  0.21
  −
  (−0.34)
  =
  0.63
  whereas
  in
  the
  Noisy
condition
   3 =
  0.5
  −
  0.21
  +
  (−0.34)
  =
  −0.05.
  The
  changes
  in
  precision
  parameters
  are
  log
  scaled,
  e.g.
  for
  the
  Smooth
  condition
  ˘s =
  exp(4
  −
  3.2
  −
  2.2)
  =
  0.25
  whereas
  in
the
  Noisy
  condition,
  ˘s =
  exp(4
  −
  3.2
  +
  2.2)
  =
  20.
  Finally,
  changes
  in
  the
  prior
  beliefs
  about
  the
  attracting
  location
  were
  also
  log
  scaled,
  e.g.
  in
  the
  Fast
  Noisy
  condition,
 8 =
  (2 /32)
  ×
  exp(−0.4
  +
  0.15
  +
  0.13)
  =
  (2 /32)
  ×
  0.88.
paradigm
  to
  phenotype
  behaviour
  in
  terms
  of
  subjective
  precision
in
  a
  normative
  setting
  and
  then
  show
  that
  this
  behavioural
  pheno-
type
  has
  neuronal
  correlates
  (see
  below).
  This
  involves
  expressing
free
  energy
  in
  terms
  of
  prediction
  errors
  and
  then
  associating
predictions
  and
  prediction
  errors
  with
  various
  neuronal
  popula-
tions
  in
  the
  cortical
  laminae
  –
  such
  that
  superﬁcial
  pyramidal
cells
  pass
  ascending
  prediction
  errors
  to
  higher
  hierarchical
  lev-
els
  and
  receive
  descending
  predictions
  from
  deep
  pyramidal
  cells
(Mumford,
 1992).
 In
 this
 setting,
 precision
 is
 thought
 to
 be
 encoded
by
  the
  postsynaptic
  gain
  of
  cells
  reporting
  prediction
  error;
  i.e.,
  the
gain
  of
  pyramidal
  cells
  sending
  forward
  connections
  in
  the
  brain
(Feldman
  and
  Friston,
  2010).
  This
  is
  important,
  because
  many
  psy-
chopathologies
  implicate
  neuromodulation
  and
  a
  putative
  failure
of
  postsynaptic
  gain
  control.
  In
  our
  previous
  paper
  (Adams
  et
  al.,
2012),
  we
  exploited
  this
  link
  to
  simulate
  the
  failures
  of
  active
inference
  during
  SPEM
  that
  are
  typical
  of
  schizophrenia
  –
  whose
pathophysiology
  is
  thought
  to
  involve
  abnormalities
  of
  dopami-
nergic
  and
  NMDA
  receptor
  function
  (Laruelle
  et
  al.,
  2003).
4.
  Conclusion
In
 summary,
 we
 have
 described
 a
 procedure
 to
 estimate
 (subjec-
tive)
 Bayesian
 beliefs
 that
 underlie
 oculomotor
 pursuit
 movements
–
  using
  an
  occlusion
  paradigm
  and
  dynamic
  causal
  modelling.
  The
beliefs
  in
  question
  here
  are
  formal
  Bayesian
  beliefs
  expressed
  in
terms
  of
  normative
  models
  of
  oculomotor
  pursuit.
  Although
  this
work
 is
 primarily
 a
 proof
 of
 principle
 –
 that
 it
 is
 possible
 to
 estimate
beliefs
 from
 non-invasive
 eye
 tracking
 data
 –
 its
 results
 speak
 to
 the
crucial
  role
  of
  precision
  or
  conﬁdence
  in
  nuancing
  the
  way
  that
  we
sample
  our
  world
  (Warren
  et
  al.,
  2012;
  Yang
  et
  al.,
  2012;
  Bogadhi
et
  al.,
  2013).
  Indeed,
  it
  was
  this
  aspect
  of
  perceptual
  inference
  that
we
  were
  interested
  in
  because–in
  the
  setting
  of
  predictive
  coding
–
  the
  suboptimal
  encoding
  of
  precision
  or
  uncertainty
  may
  under-
lie
  false
  inference
  in
  several
  neuropsychiatric
  syndromes
  (Adams
et
  al.,
  2013b).
From
  a
  technical
  point
  of
  view,
  this
  work
  introduces
  the
  appli-
cation
  of
  dynamic
  causal
  modelling
  to
  eye
  movement
  data.
  In
particular,
  it
  suggests
  that
  interesting
  questions
  can
  be
  addressed
to
  response
  averages
  –
  in
  exactly
  the
  same
  way
  that
  event
  related
potentials
  summarise
  average
  electrophysiological
  responses
  to
well-controlled
  experimental
  stimuli.
  In
  terms
  of
  modelling,
  we
have
  also
  shown
  that
  it
  is
  possible
  to
  use
  empirical
  data
  to
  inform
(invert)
  relatively
  sophisticated
  Bayesian
  or
  normative
  models
  of
behaviour.
  There
  are
  many
  carefully
  constructed
  and
  validated
descriptive
  SPEM
  models
  in
  the
  literature
  (e.g.
  Barnes,
  2008;
  Deno
et
  al.,
  1995;
  Krauzlis
  and
  Lisberger,
  1989;
  Krauzlis,
  2004;
  Lisberger,
2010;
 Robinson
 et
 al.,
 1986;
 Shibata
 et
 al.,
 2005):
 however,
 the
 gen-
erative
  model
  that
  we
  used
  is
  distinguished
  in
  the
  sense
  that
  it
  is
a
  special
  case
  of
  generic
  (predictive
  coding)
  models
  that
  conform
to
 normative
 (Bayesian)
 principles.
 We
 have
 previously
 shown
 that
formally
  similar
  generative
  models
  can
  reproduce
  both
  control
  and
schizophrenic
  subjects’
  pursuit
  of
  targets
  whose
  occlusion
  is
  either
expected
  or
  unexpected,
  and
  of
  targets
  that
  unpredictably
  change
direction
  (Adams
  et
  al.,
  2012).
  They
  can
  also
  reproduce
  the
  effects
of
  contrast
  (sensory
  precision)
  on
  pursuit,
  such
  that
  perceived
  lag
increases
  with
  contrast
  but
  true
  lag
  decreases,
  and
  the
  anticipatory
initiation
  of
  pursuit
  of
  a
  hemi-periodic
  target
  (Perrinet
  et
  al.,
  2014).
More
  generally,
  there
  are
  a
  whole
  series
  of
  publications
  using
  the
this
  active
  inference
  framework
  to
  study
  saccadic
  eye
  movements,
perceptual
 categorisation,
 omission
 related
 responses,
 handwriting
recognition,
  the
  mismatch
  negativity,
  sequential
  choice
  behaviour
and
  so
  on.
The
  idea
  of
  precision-weighted
  prediction
  error
  has
  important
commonalities
 with
 a
 ubiquitous
 construct
 in
 SPEM
 modelling:
 that
of
  pursuit
  velocity
  being
  driven
  by
  gain
  control
  of
  the
  mismatch
between
  eye
  and
  target
  velocity
  (Barnes,
  2008;
  Churchland
  and
Lisberger,
 2002).
 Indeed,
 Orban
 de
 Xivry
 et
 al.
 (2013)
 demonstrated
that
  two
  Kalman
  ﬁlters
  (using
  precision-weighted
  prediction
errors)
  can
  account
  for
  both
  visually
  guided
  and
  predictive
  eye
movements
 respectively.
 One
 fundamental
 difference
 between
 our
model
  and
  others
  is
  that
  our
  model
  uses
  predictive
  coding
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than
  optimal
  control,
  and
  therefore
  does
  not
  require
  efference
copies
  of
  motor
  commands–because
  predictions
  of
  eye
  and
  tar-
get
  dynamics
  (i.e.,
  corollary
  discharge)
  are
  generated
  directly
  by
the
  forward
  model
  (Friston,
  2011).
  In
  other
  words,
  the
  purpose
  of
efference
  copy
  in
  optimal
  control
  is
  to
  create
  corollary
  discharge
–
  i.e.
  predictions
  in
  sensory
  coordinates
  –
  but
  in
  predictive
  coding
these
  predictions
  are
  generated
  directly,
  so
  efference
  copy
  itself
  is
redundant.
  The
  cortical
  oculomotor
  system
  can
  therefore
  operate
entirely
  in
  visual,
  rather
  than
  motor,
  coordinates
  (Lee
  et
  al.,
  2013).
Another
  key
  difference
  is
  the
  explicit
  parameterisation
  of
  hier-
archical
  precision:
  in
  effect,
  the
  (attentional)
  gain
  control
  of
prediction
  error
  at
  every
  level
  of
  the
  cortical
  hierarchy,
  not
  just
  at
the
  level
  of
  eye
  movement
  generation.
  Having
  said
  this,
  it
  would
  be
entirely
  possible
  to
  compare
  the
  evidence
  of
  different
  generative
models
  based
  upon
  data
  of
  the
  sort
  analysed
  in
  this
  paper
  using
DCM
  and
  response
  averages.
  Here,
  we
  have
  focused
  on
  comparing
models
  with
  and
  without
  changes
  in
  precision;
  however,
  in
  princi-
ple,
  one
  can
  compare
  any
  model
  (of
  the
  same
  data)
  using
  Bayesian
model
  comparison.
From
  a
  neurobiological
  perspective,
  the
  results
  reported
  above
provide
  an
  important
  motivation
  for
  looking
  for
  the
  neuronal
  cor-
relates
  of
  precision
  updates
  in
  electrophysiological
  responses.
  In
particular,
  the
  changes
  in
  precision
  induced
  by
  changes
  in
  target
motion
  noise
  should
  –
  under
  predictive
  coding
  models
  of
  oculo-
motor
  pursuit
  –
  be
  mediated
  by
  changes
  in
  the
  gain
  of
  superﬁcial
pyramidal
 cells
 in
 the
 early
 visual
 and
 oculomotor
 system.
 Dynamic
causal
  modelling
  of
  event
  related
  potentials
  has
  already
  been
  used
to
 quantify
 these
 gain
 changes
 –
 in
 terms
 of
 neural
 mass
 models
 and
recurrent
  self-inhibition
  –
  using
  manipulations
  of
  visual
  precision
in
 terms
 of
 luminance
 contrast
 (Brown
 and
 Friston,
 2012).
 We
 hope
to
  use
  a
  similar
  approach
  to
  assess
  changes
  in
  recurrent
  (intrin-
sic)
 connectivity
 using
 the
 occlusion
 paradigm
 described
 above
 and
magnetoencephalography.
Clearly,
  it
  is
  difﬁcult
  to
  model
  the
  physiological
  details
  of
  pre-
dictive
 coding;
 however,
 recent
 efforts
 to
 reﬁne
 neurophysiological
models
 of
 canonical
 microcircuitry
 and
 hierarchical
 (extrinsic)
 con-
nections
  have
  tried
  to
  bring
  the
  underlying
  neuronal
  architectures
closer
  to
  those
  that
  would
  support
  predictive
  coding
  (Bastos
  et
  al.,
2012).
  In
  future
  work,
  we
  will
  use
  the
  results
  of
  the
  current
study
  to
  guide
  searches
  of
  neurophysiological
  models
  that
  explain
average
  electrophysiological
  responses
  to
  visual
  occlusion
  during
oculomotor
  pursuit.
  This
  represents
  a
  further
  step
  in
  validating
non-invasive
 measures
 of
 neuromodulatory
 gain
 control
 –
 engaged
during
  perceptual
  inference
  –
  that
  can
  be
  used
  in
  conditions
  like
schizophrenia.
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